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Introduction and Summary 
Sixteen years following the culmination of its civil war in genocide, Rwanda 
has been described as a country which has successfully exited from violence.1   It has 
not experienced serious internal insecurity since the events of 1994 and a minor 
insurgency in 1997-8.  Yet a note of caution must be sounded.  Rwanda’s apparent 
stability depends in large part on the government’s main ruling party, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), which won Rwanda’s civil war and ended the genocide, and in 
particular increasingly on its present leadership under President Paul Kagame.  
Together they have charted a path for Rwanda of their own making, and are 
understandably sensitive to outsider views on their choices given international 
indifference to the country’s plight in 1994.  Yet this dependence on the ruling party 
and increasingly on its leadership raises the question of what would happen in their 
absence.  How capable is Rwanda today, after 16 years of policies designed to 
transform its society and economy, of withstanding the stresses which pushed it 
towards violence in 1994, without the current regime?   
This report aims to assess the steps taken during Rwanda’s transition 
following the genocide against the objective of the long-term durability of domestic 
peace.  Its principal conclusion is that peace is most likely to endure if Rwanda’s 
political space is gradually opened up to allow (i) Rwanda’s formal state institutions 
to establish greater autonomy from the current regime and (ii) Rwandan political and 
civil society – its political opposition and media in particular – to evolve as mature 
and independent counterweights to the ruling party.  Incremental political 
liberalization would encourage an important shift in Rwanda’s political culture to one 
which encouraged accountability for the subordination of institutional rules to 
personal, party, or ethnic interests.  It falls on the regime to to show the way forward 
to Rwanda’s civil and political society by demonstrating its tolerance for genuine 
political pluralism, dissent, and inclusion.  It is in the regime’s long-term strategic 
self-interest to encourage such a change in political culture and increase its legitimacy 
in order to discourage attempts to bring about regime change extra-constitutionally.    
It is easy to look at Rwanda today and forget the enormous challenges, limited 
resources, and difficult choices facing its new government: a traumatized and divided 
society, a country stripped of individuals qualified to run its public services, and an 
infrastructure devastated by war.  Yet following the genocide Rwanda’s new 
government created a remarkable vision for the re-making of the country.  The 
economy is the centerpiece of this vision and the regime has made impressive strides 
to re-build and to re-structure it to meet an ambitious developmental goal.  Vision 
2020 sets out the regime’s strategy for Rwanda to transition from a low-income, 
agricultural-based economy to a lower middle-income, more knowledge-based 
economy by the year 2020.  There is certainly the political will to achieve this dream.  
The country’s President, Paul Kagame, appears genuinely committed to transforming 
Rwanda’s economy.  He has for example taken firm action against corruption, 
liberalized sectors such as telecoms and banking, lowered taxes to attract foreign 
investment, stabilized inflation, enhanced Rwanda’s trade within the region, and 
                                                        
1 The World Bank’s 2009-12 Country Assistance Strategy for Rwanda states that: ‘So far, 
Rwanda’s approach to promoting inclusive and stable politics and governance appears to be working. 
The country is at peace and among the most stable on the continent.’ 
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reformed land rights.  Underlying these impressive pro-growth policies, which have 
been met with approval by Rwanda’s donors, is the government’s belief that 
economic prosperity is a cornerstone of social stability and it has pinned much on this 
assumption.2  However, this paper argues that the importance of political inclusion 
and legitimacy should also not be underestimated.  Rwanda’s leadership does 
recognize that this ambitious economic transition remains potentially vulnerable.  Its 
policies suggestthough that the principal risk arises instead from the absence of an 
accompanying transformation of Rwandan society.     
In recognition of this fragility the government’s vision incorporates an 
ambitious goal for social change.  The civil war and genocide had powerfully re-
inscribed the division between Rwanda’s ethnic majority Hutu and ethnic minority 
Tutsi.   It was a divide that had been activated on several other occasions in Rwanda’s 
history to violent effect, and following the genocide the Rwandan government took 
the bold step of outlawing ethnic identification altogether in the public sphere.3  It 
instead promoted the narrative of a single national identity within Rwandan society.  
The remarkable character of this strategy becomes apparent when one remembers that 
the paradigm usually favoured by international mediators following conflict is to 
explicitly balance the interests of ethnic or sectarian groups in the constitutional re-
design of the nation.4  The regime’s intention in the short-term was to silence the 
ethnic rhetoric which had driven the genocide, thereby creating a space for inter-
ethnic healing, and in the longer-term to minimize ethnicity as a force in public life. 
The Rwandan government then appears to be aiming ultimately for a post-ethnic 
society in which a Rwandan national identity would become the primary form of 
collective identification.   
Yet there is some uncertainty over whether sincere inter-ethnic healing and 
reconciliation, let alone a post-ethnic society, are in fact emerging.  Critics describe 
Rwanda as a society in which there is non-violent co-existence based on necessity and 
enforced from above, rather than genuine peace and unity between Hutu and Tutsi.5   
                                                        
2 The Government of Rwanda, in its comments on this report, stated that ‘economic factors are 
critical to long-term reconciliation…’ and emphasized the role of ‘economic progress in underpinning 
the rule of law and therefore stability and peaceful co-existence in ethnically plural Rwanda.’     
3 The Government of Rwanda, again in its comments on the report, emphasizes that the 
prohibition on ethnic identification does not extend beyond the public sphere and that Rwandans may 
still identify as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa privately.  The purpose of the prohibition, it states, is ‘…to 
remove ethnic labeling as the basis for discrimination, denial of service and policy-making...’ and ‘…to 
calm down ethnic passion and to silence ethnic identification and promote a narrative of national 
identity in order to nurture an environment for inter-communal peace and dialogue…’  In practice this 
prohibition has extended into the private sphere and in my own field visits I have noted that Rwandans 
consciously avoid using the terms Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.      
4 The ethnic labels, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were not mentioned at all in Rwanda’s constitution 
when it was first adopted by popular referendum in 2003.   
5 Several independent scholars have suggested that inter-ethnic reconciliation has not yet 
materialized in Rwanda 14 years after the genocide, that the ethnic categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 
remain salient in post-genocide Rwanda, and even that the prohibition on ethnic identification may be 
unhelpful in bringing about inter-ethnic reconciliation.  For example, Suzanne Buckley-Sistel, 
following field research interviewing ordinary Rwandans in 2002-3, writes that ‘…antagonisms based 
on ethnic identities of Hutu or Tutsi persist between the parties to the conflict, revealing the continuity 
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Internal order is assured in part because the Rwandan state has an effective 
intelligence service, police force, and military capable of controlling the population 
and securing the small territory it inhabits.  The implication being that in the absence 
of this external constraint, grievances - ethnic, regional, or otherwise - may rise to the 
surface.  In other words, the opportunity but not necessarily the motivation to 
mobilize is closed, and compliance of the population should not be mistaken for 
consent.  Put differently, regime capacity – the ability of the regime to control its 
population - is a different cause of internal order to regime legitimacy – the accepted 
right of the regime to govern a people.6   Yet we simply do not know how far Rwanda 
has moved from being a state with a divided society to being a nation united.    
The Rwandan government itself also appears uncertain over exactly how 
cohesive Rwandan society is today.  This uncertainty is reflected in its careful 
management of the country’s political space.  It fears that if the country opens up 
politically too much and too quickly – the depth and pace of political liberalization - 
that the opportunity for ethnic extremism to emerge from the background of Rwandan 
society to the foreground of Rwandan politics will arise once again - as it did in the 
period preceding the genocide and in the period immediately before and after 
                                                                                                                                                               
of ethnic cleavages and the absence of social transformation.’  See We are Pretending Peace:  Local 
Memory and the Absence of Social Transformation and Reconciliation in Rwanda in After Genocide: 
Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, Clark, 
Phil, and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds, New York, NY: Columbia University Press and London, UK: C. 
Hurst & Co, 2008, pg. 128.  Lyndsay Mclean Hilker states, based on her ethnographic research on 
young Rwandans in Kigali, that ‘… despite current state policies that seek to de-emphasize ‘ethnic’ 
identities, ethnicity remains salient in contemporary Rwanda.  Although many young Rwandans 
continue to forge inter-ethnic ties, there is a persistent desire to know the ethnic identity of significant 
others and to categorize them on an ongoing basis…The evidence presented suggests that current 
approaches to reconciliation do not sufficiently address the ‘ethnic’ logic that persists in Rwanda and 
may instead be entrenching it, increasing the risk that any recurrence of violence would once again 
have ‘ethnic’ targets and be as extensive and brutal as 1994’.  See Everyday Ethnicities:  Identity and 
Reconciliation among Rwandan Youth, Journal of Genocide Research 2009, 11:1, pp. 81-100.  René 
Lemarchand provocatively argues that ‘Ironically, while aimed at eliminating the ‘divisions of the 
past’, the decree on ethnicity makes them all the more pregnant with mutual enmities.  The imposition 
of an official memory purged of ethnic references, is not just a convenient ploy to mask the brutal 
realities of ethnic discrimination; it institutionalizes a mode of thought control profoundly antithetical 
to any kind of inter-ethnic dialogue aimed at a rethinking of the atrocities of mass murder.  This is 
hardly the way to bring Hutu and Tutsi together in a common understanding of their tragic past.’  In 
After Genocide, pg. 75.   
6 The Government of Rwanda disagrees with the view that Rwanda’s social stability is based 
on the state’s capacity to control the population and argued instead that state institutions enjoy 
considerable natural legitimacy.  Senior Adviser to the President of Rwanda Dr. Kimonyo wrote that 
this view ‘harks back to the stereotype of the obedient Rwandan and overlooks clear evidence that co-
existence is indeed taking place and that government institutions enjoy significant legitimacy. Surveys, 
including the World Values Survey show low levels of social trust, but they report that Rwandans have 
very high trust in state institutions, including trust in the police and the army.’  In addition to the World 
Values Survey, the Government of Rwanda points to another international survey, the Legatum 
Prosperty Index 2010.  According to this index 95% of Rwandans expressed confidence in their 
national government, 98% in the military and 84% in the judiciary, placing Rwanda in the top 10 of all 
the 110 countries ranked in 2010 for these scores.  In my view some caution must be exercised in 
interpreting these data given the possibility for self-censorship in a country whose record on civil 
liberties is poor.  The same Legatum Prosperity Index ranked Rwanda 88 out of 110 countries in its 
measure of personal freedom.   
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Rwanda’s independence.  The regime equates competitive politics with ethnic 
violence in Rwanda, and does not know how resistant Rwandan society would be to 
extremists’ appeals to mobilize along ethnic lines once more.7    
The Rwandan government has legitimate concerns then regarding the possible 
consequences of political liberalization and the protection of the country’s Tutsi 
minority is rightfully high among these concerns.  Advocates of greater political 
freedom and human rights norms - whose energies are often focused on the concerns 
of politically-weaker government opponents - should not underestimate the risk posed 
by potentially divisive individuals within Rwandan society.  It is a risk heightened by 
Rwanda’s highly unusual ethnic demography, one which distinguishes it from most 
other sub-Saharan states:  Rwanda comprises only two numerically important ethnic 
groups and one group, the Hutu majority, is overwhelmingly larger than the other, the 
Tutsi minority.  This minority is concerned for its renewed persecution if a Hutu-
majority government were to be democratically empowered.  
Mindful of these concerns, the Rwandan government is sensitive to criticism 
that it wrongly equates the existential survival of the Tutsi minority with the political 
survival of the regime and its ruling elite.  However, although its stated political ideal 
is ‘consensus’ rather than ‘competitive’ democracy’, at times when its political 
survival has faced potential challenges – such as during the 2003 and 2010 elections – 
the regime took steps which are consistent with neither of these political visions.8  In 
particular, it faced criticism for using its laws prohibiting genocide ideology and 
sectarianism to constrain its political opponents.9  On those occasions where it was 
legitimate dissent rather than ethnic divisionism on the part of political opponents, the 
regime’s actions curtailed rather than liberalized political space in Rwanda.  Such 
actions exemplify the subversion of institutional independence to personal, party, and 
ethnic interests of which the regime should be mindful.     
While political liberalization then may seem perilous to the regime, in the 
longer-term the alternative may not be better.  In the absence of a change in political 
culture, continued political exclusion may force the steam of ethnic or indeed other 
‘grievances’ to simply continue to accumulate inside the pressure cooker.  This has a 
dangerous self-reinforcing logic:  the government will feel compelled to exert even 
more control to counter even more pressure.  It is this note of caution which must be 
sounded when assessing Rwanda’s exit from violence, and it is a note reinforced by a 
reading of Rwanda’s history.  All three of Rwanda’s previous regimes were regimes 
in which power was held by one ethnic group to the exclusion of the other and all 
                                                        
7 Dr. Jean-Paul Kimonyo, writes ‘…the two short periods of plural politics, between 1957-
1963 and 1991-1994, have both led to mass killings with political parties and independent media 
playing a big role in that violence.’   He goes on:  ‘The issue here is how do you ensure political 
cooperation when confrontational politics will almost certainly lead to renewed violence?’  See his 
article ‘Understanding Rwanda’s Journey’ in the Huffington Post, March 8th 2010, available online. 
8 Ibid. The Government of Rwanda’s preference for ‘consensus democracy’ over ‘competitive 
politics’ appears in the same article by Dr. Kimonyo.   
9 For more detail on the use of these laws, see Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of 
Rwanda’s Laws on Genocide Ideology and Sectarianism, Amnesty International, August 2010.  The 
government began a review of the ‘Genocide Ideology’ law in April 2010 with a view to amending it.   
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three of these regimes came to an end through extra-constitutional and violent means:  
the Tutsi monarchy in 1959 and the two Hutu ethnocracies in 1973 and 1994.  For 
President Kagame and the RPF the danger is that eventually opponents may also 
come to see an extra-constitutional transition of power as the only means of change.     
In sum, post-conflict stability premised on economic growth and strong 
leadership - but without political liberalization in the longer term - may have a finite 
duration and a possibly dramatic ending.  In the absence of a re-opening of political 
space, Rwanda faces several possibilities for regime change.  The most likely of these 
today is the risk of a coup from within the ruling party itself.10 In the past, Rwanda’s 
regimes have also ended through popular revolution (1959-62) and external military 
action (1990-94).  The power vacuum that would ensue were these situations to recur 
would leave Rwanda vulnerable to exploitation by extremists.  The optimal strategy 
for a peaceful transition of power then would be a gradual increase in political space 
so that Rwanda’s formal state institutions and civil and political society are able to 
emerge as mature and independent counterweights to the ruling party.     
 
Part I 
a. Causes and Dynamics of Conflict 
Rwanda’s genocide was facilitated by several longstanding structural and 
historical vulnerabilities, but precipitated by other, shorter-term macro-political 
events.  The most important historical factor predisposing Rwanda to inter-group 
conflict was an ethnically-divided society in which power had become equated with 
one ethnic group to the exclusion of the other.  It was Rwanda’s colonizer, Belgium, 
which first created this equation.  It accentuated differences between the Hutu 
majority and Tutsi minority, reinforcing a sense of racial superiority in the latter and 
privileging this group with positions of authority and power.  The equation continued 
following independence from Belgium, but with the exclusion of the Tutsi minority 
under Hutu-controlled Republics.  These grievance narratives of ethnic exclusion 
would be activated at later points in Rwanda’s postcolonial history.  Structurally, a 
significant community of Banyarwanda lived outside of Rwanda as refugees.  These 
were Tutsi exiled following a Hutu Revolution in 1959-62 which ended the Tutsi 
                                                        
10 In September 2010, four senior figures in the ruling party, exiled outside of Rwanda, issued 
a joint report publicly criticizing President Kagame and the regime.  In it they called upon Rwandans to 
challenge the regime and write:  ‘Rwanda is essentially a hard-line, one-party, secretive police state 
with a façade of democracy. The ruling RPF has closed space for political participation. The RPF does 
not tolerate political opposition or open competition for power.  The government ensures its monopoly 
of power by means of draconian restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental human rights of 
citizens. The press, civil society and opposition parties are deprived of freedom to operate freely. 
President Kagame and the ruling party that he leads depend on repression to stay in power.’  These four 
individuals had held high-level positions in the government:  Dr. Théogène Rudasingwa, former Chief 
of Staff to President Kagame, former Secretary-General of the RPF, and former Ambassador to the 
United States; Gerald Gahima, former Prosecutor-General and Vice-President of the Supreme Court; 
Colonel Patrick Karegeya, former head of Rwanda’s intelligence service; and Lieutenant-General 
Kayumba Nyamwasa, former Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army and former Ambassador to India.   
 
Structural 
vulnerabilities to 
violence 
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monarchy, ushering in Rwanda’s independence and establishing the country’s first 
Hutu-ruled Republic.  Within this community of refugees lay both the grievance and 
the opportunity for rebellion.  In addition to being excluded from Rwandan society 
and politics for nearly two generations, these Tutsi refugees also faced discrimination 
in several of their host countries, notably Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), and Tanzania.  The Tutsi diaspora also provided the financing and the 
recruits necessary for the invasion of Rwanda in 1990 with the objective of forcing a 
return.  
Yet we cannot draw a straight line from Rwanda’s past to the genocide of 
1994.  Several important, more short-term macro-political events pushed Rwanda 
over the edge and into the abyss.  These events all took place in the short window of 
1990-94.  They were: (i) democratization; (ii) the civil war; and (iii) assassination of 
the Head of State.  While none of these is an unusual event in sub-Saharan Africa by 
themselves, their simultaneous occurrence is unprecedented in the region’s post-
independence history. 
At the heart of each these trigger events lies a threat-opportunity 
mechanism:  a threat to existing, incumbent interests, and an opportunity for new, 
challenger interests.  Thus Rwanda’s civil war represented an external security threat 
to the incumbent Hutu regime, and an opportunity for the largely-Tutsi rebel group to 
seize power.  Democratization represented an internal political threat to the ruling 
elite, and an opportunity for Rwanda’s newly-legitimized political counter-elite to 
participate in politics.  Finally, the assassination of Rwanda’s longstanding and 
authoritarian Head of State, Juvénal Habyarimana, in April 1994 represented a 
massive political opportunity – a power vacuum – which extremists exploited and 
captured the state until forced from office by the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF).   
A point to note here is that the precipitants for violence were dynamic 
transition-centric variables.  It was several sudden and rapid changes to the existing 
order which tipped a vulnerable country into violence.  Relatively static variables 
such as a history/narrative of ethnic antagonism, social cleavages, authoritarian 
regime type, and inequality in resource allocation are not determinative, but 
probabilistic variables: structural vulnerabilities.  Thus for example, it was not simply 
because Rwanda was an autocracy that ethnic violence occurred.  It was in the 
transition from autocracy to democracy that violence emerged.  During Rwanda’s 
Second Republic, there had not been any major incident of ethnic violence from 1973 
until 1990, even though it had been an authoritarian regime, headed by a military 
General.   
Finally, although a scholarly consensus is forming around the factors outlined 
above, it is worth summarizing the various competing explanations of the genocide 
which have emerged during the 16 years since the genocide.   One of the earliest 
explanations focused on one particularity of Rwanda:  its status as the most-densely 
populated county in Africa.   Neo-Malthusian theories centre on the coincidence of 
environmental scarcity – Rwanda’s limited and increasingly infertile arable land - 
with demographic pressure – Rwanda’s remarkably high population growth.  
Diamond makes one of the most well-known claims in this regard in his work 
Precipitants of 
violence 
Alternative 
theories 
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‘Collapse’ – though he is not alone.11  Yet, while the rise of land inequality and land 
conflict in the years preceding the genocide are undeniable, there are reasons to 
believe this did not contribute to the genocide in the ways claimed.  First, they do not 
explain the timing of the genocide.  Population density was historically high long 
before the 1990s, and in fact demographic pressures are even greater in post-genocide 
Rwanda.   Yet violence occurred very specifically in 1994.  Second, new research 
suggests that while some individuals saw the material benefits of killing, these 
benefits mainly comprised moveable property such as livestock, zinc sheeting, and 
crops – but rarely land whose ownership in the event of death had to be resolved by 
local authorities.12  Third, pre-genocide land conflicts were not inter-ethnic but in the 
main intra-ethnic, and often within families.   
A second set of theories focus on another particularity of Rwanda:  its status as 
one of the poorest nations of the world.  Rwanda ranked 149th out of 173 countries in 
the UNDP Human Development Index of 1993, the year before the genocide.   As a 
result, arguments centred on deprivation have flourished - from basic arguments 
focused on desperation born of poverty to more sophisticated constructs such as 
‘structural violence’.13    This latter concept is tied to notions of inequality, 
humiliation, and social exclusion.  However, there has been little empirical support in 
large part because of the methodological challenge of operationalizing and measuring 
such constructs and also tying them to individual-level participation in the genocide.   
Both culturalist and rationalist theories have also gained traction in the context 
of Rwanda.  One of the more popular culturalist explanations emphasizes the deeply-
ingrained value of obedience in Rwanda.14  It essentially accounts for the massive 
mobilization of the population during the genocide by pointing to the willingness of 
ordinary Rwandans to obey higher authority.  However, there is evidence that 
ordinary Rwandans are not such blind automatons – evident for example in their 
willingness to oppose the state on other issues such as what crops to plant and 
whether to participate in gacaca, the state-sponsored community justice process.   
Rwandans may comply with state-sanctioned orders when they fear the costs of non-
compliance, but compliance should not be confused with obedience or consent.  A 
well-known rationalist theory examines the role of threat and fear.  De Figureido and 
Weingast point to the strategic calculations made by a segment of Rwanda’s 
                                                        
11 Jared Diamond, Collapse:  How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed,  London: Allen Lane, 
2005.  See also  C. André and J. P. Platteau, "Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught 
in the Malthusian Trap," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34, no. 1 (1998) and Thomas 
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999).   
12 See Omar McDoom:  The Micro-Politics of Mass Violence:  Security, Authority, and 
Opportunity in Rwanda’s Genocide, Doctoral thesis, London School of Economics, 2009   
13 See Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence : The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, 
CT: Kumarian Press, 1998) 
14 See Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Co., 
1998), pg.248. 
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governing elite.15 This ruling elite rationalized that by forcing ordinary Rwandans to 
kill their Tutsi civilian neighbours, these Rwandans would then be forced to support 
the extremist elite over a possible incoming rebel and mainly Tutsi army which would 
want to avenge their ethnic brethren’s deaths.   While this may provide a logical 
explanation for individual participation in the violence, this argument does not 
provide an explanation of why the macro-conditions which gave rise to these choices 
arose in the first place.   
A final set of arguments point to the risks of political liberalization or more 
specifically democratization.  Michael Mann’s work ‘The Dark Side of Democracy’ 
emphasizes the dangers of the transition from autocracy to democracy in multi-ethnic 
societies.16  ‘Ethnos’ and ‘Demos’ become entwined he argues, and targeting of the 
ethnic minority is justified by the ethnic majority’s claim of democratic entitlement to 
rule.  Jack Snyder’s book ‘From Voting to Violence’ also highlights the dangers of 
democratic transition and focuses on the emergence of exclusionary nationalisms.17  
He points to the rise of the ‘Hutu Power’ movement in Rwanda in the years 
immediately before the genocide.  While there is merit to these theses in the context 
of Rwanda, clearly, however, not all democratic transitions lead to ethnic violence.  It 
is for this reason that other conditions have been specified – such as the coincidence 
of the civil war - to explain why Rwanda in particular experienced genocide. 
 
b. Short-term Confidence and Peace-Building 
Countries typically exit from civil war either through outright military victory 
by one party or else through negotiated settlement between the warring parties.  
Rwanda’s civil war ended with total victory for the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the 
mainly Tutsi rebel group, which defeated Rwanda’s Hutu extremist government 
sending it into exile in eastern DRC.  This is in marked contrast with Rwanda’s 
neighbouring cousin, Burundi, which exited from ethnic conflict through a power-
sharing deal brokered with international mediation between the various fighting 
factions.   There had also been considerable efforts to mediate Rwanda’s civil war and 
a power-sharing agreement had been signed in August 1993 between the ruling 
MRND party, the rebel RPF, and Rwanda’s domestic opposition parties.  However, 
the balance-of-power struck in the Arusha Accord did not reflect the perceptions of 
the balance-of-power held by its signatories.   It is this disjuncture which ultimately 
led to the Accord’s failure, and more problematically pushed the civil war into a 
struggle from which would emerge a winner and a loser.   Under the terms of the 
Accord, the ruling MRND party would have broadly the same political power as the 
rebel RPF:  5 Ministerial posts with the President remaining MRND and a Vice-Prime 
                                                        
15 Rui De Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism 
and Ethnic Conflict," in Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Walter and Snyder (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999). 
16 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy : Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
17 Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence : Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 
Norton Series in World Politics (New York London,  Norton, 2000) 
Civil war 
termination 
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Minister post created for the RPF.  The remaining 11 Ministerial posts were to be 
divided among the 4 domestic opposition parties with the post of Prime Minister 
going to the main opposition party, the MDR.  The military would be integrated and 
composed of 60% government forces and 40% RPF forces.  An important practical 
implication of the Arusha Accord was that civilian and military jobs then held by 
members of the ruling MRND would be lost.  Moreover, while the Tutsi represented 
less than 20% of the population, the RPF (seen as a mainly Tutsi party) had received a 
disproportionate share of civilian and military power.  The principle of 
proportionality, a feature of consociational government, had been violated.  This was 
unacceptable to hardliners in the non-RPF parties.   The assassination of Rwanda’s 
MRND President on April 6th 1994 marked the end of the peace process and the start 
of the win-lose struggle.  The RPF emerged victorious just over 100 days later.   
Overall, in the immediate transition following the civil war and genocide, the 
RPF, relied less on a strategy to enhance its legitimacy, and more on a strategy to 
protect and reinforce its capabilities vis-à-vis political opponents and Rwandan 
society.  It could do so because it operated from a position of strength as the winner in 
the civil war.   This may otherwise have been much more difficult in a mediated 
settlement where the necessity of balancing power between stakeholders would have 
dictated a different strategy.  Thus the RPF was able to set the terms and the pace of 
Rwanda’s transitional period.  The longevity of the RPF - and thus the origins of the 
Rwanda’s post-conflict stability - can be traced to the terms of the transition, and it is 
worth examining them in detail.   
The RPF institutionalized its position of strength both constitutionally and 
practically following its victory.  Constitutionally, the RPF issued a Declaration on 
July 14th 1994 upon victory, and then on November 24th 1994 signed a Protocol of 
Agreement with 7 political parties to install a broad-based transitional government.    
The RPF Declaration altered the balance-of-power struck in the Arusha Accord of 
1993.  Most notably it created a stronger Presidency and a new office of Vice-
President – which would also carry a Ministerial portfolio.   The Presidency would be 
occupied by Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu member of the RPF, and the Vice-Presidency 
by Paul Kagame, the Tutsi military commander of the RPF.  The Protocol of 
Agreement also changed another important provision of the Arusha Accord.  It 
envisaged a much longer transitional period.  Instead of 22 months, Rwanda’s 
transitional government was set to last 7 years, and in fact was extended to 9 years 
before elections were held in 2003.  This long transitional period reflected the higher 
premium placed on maintaining order in the short-term than on promoting political 
participation.  Again it was possible because the civil war had ended in military 
victory rather than negotiated settlement.  In any event, the conditions to hold early 
elections were not there with massive numbers of persons displaced and traumatized 
by the violence.  It is also likely that elections would have been contested along ethnic 
lines so soon after ethnic violence, and this would have meant the RPF would face the 
prospect of being democratically ousted given that its support base would have been 
drawn from numerically inferior Tutsi minority.   
 Under the terms of the transition then, the Presidency became the most 
influential institution in the new constitutional order.  Article 7 of the RPF 
Declaration recognized that ‘the President of the Republic decides in a sovereign way’ 
in the event that the government cannot reach agreement.   Under the Arusha Accord, 
Terms of the 
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agreement was to be by consensus in the first place, and otherwise by two thirds 
majority.  As there were 21 posts in government, a veto was effectively exercised by 
any party which held 8 posts.  The decision would then pass to the President.   As 
mentioned, under the Arusha Accord the RPF had been given 5 posts, but then took a 
further 3 of the 5 posts which had been reserved for the ruling party, the MRND, 
which it had defeated on the battle-field.   The RPF now possessed the necessary 8 
posts to wield a veto in the transitional government, and to thus pass the ultimate 
decision-making power to the President.   
The second, practical way the RPF would strengthen its position in the 
transition was through the state’s security apparatus.  Obviously in a post-conflict 
setting when the memory of war is still fresh, control of the military – as well as the 
police and intelligence services - is a key issue.   Yet this would prove not to be so 
contentious in the immediate aftermath of Rwanda’s civil war largely because of 
another peculiarity of how the war in fact ended.   Victory did not come with the 
surrender of the other side.  The government army, militia, and a sizeable segment of 
the country’s Hutu population simply fled over the border into what was then eastern 
Zaire.  The porosity of the region’s borders and the weakness of the Zairean state 
made this possible, along with the intervention of the French who created a 
humanitarian corridor through which the fleeing forces escaped.  The new Rwandan 
government then did not face the immediate short-term challenge of demobilizing or 
re-integrating large numbers of enemy combatants, or managing the anxieties of a 
defeated officer corps who had been complicit in the genocide.18  It would only have 
to confront major challenges of security sector reform later on as soldiers and 
civilians began to return piecemeal, both voluntarily and involuntarily, from exile in 
large numbers from 2001 onwards.  In the meantime, the RPF effectively controlled 
the important security institutions of the state: the army, the police, and the 
intelligence services.   
Although the RPF enjoyed these benefits as a result of being an outright 
military victor, it should be recognized that it chose not to press home all of its 
advantages.   It was not ‘winner-take-all’.  The RPF could for example have ruled as a 
single party as happened in Uganda after its Bush War which brought Yoweri 
Museveni’s NRM to power in 1986 - and which has been in power ever since.  
Instead the RPF undertook several, important confidence-building measures designed 
to reassure Rwanda’s Hutu majority and perhaps to appease the qualms of the 
international community – though the latter had limited influence over the RPF in the 
light of its woeful inaction during the genocide.  Nonetheless, most notably, the RPF 
did attempt at the outset to create a transitional government of national unity with 
representation from the political opposition and from both ethnic groups, based in part 
on the Arusha Accord of 1993.  The power-sharing arrangement divided the 21 
Ministries among the political parties, and included nominating a Hutu as President 
and as Prime Minister, while Paul Kagame, the victorious Tutsi rebel leader, became 
                                                        
18 Some officers in the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had not been involved in the 
genocide, were given positions in the new post-genocide army, but the majority of the FAR officer 
corps escaped into eastern Congo.   
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Vice-President.19  Although as noted above the final constitutional provisions 
concentrated power in the Presidency and thus the RPF, it was nonetheless the first 
time in Rwanda’s post-colonial history that power had been shared  even nominally - 
across ethnic lines.  The monopoly of power by either one ethnic group or the other 
had been a longstanding grievance in Rwanda’s history. 
In addition, the new government adopted a policy of national unity and 
reconciliation.  It sought to eliminate ethnic identification, which it saw as lying at the 
heart of the genocide, and promote in their place a single national Rwandan identity.  
In support of this, the government promoted an interpretation of Rwanda’s history 
which assigned primary responsibility for inter-ethnic conflict to Belgium, Rwanda’s 
colonial ruler, rather than to one ethnic group or the other.    
However, these measures have perhaps not been as successful as had been 
hoped.  As discussed in detail earlier, there is uncertainty over whether a post-ethnic 
society or even inter-ethnic reconciliation are emerging.  Similarly, the government of 
national unity – effectively an elite bargain struck between the political elite on both 
sides of the ethnic divide - did not last long.  Non-RPF and indeed even RPF members 
of the government either left or felt compelled to leave.  The majority of these 
departures took place soon after the killing of Hutu civilians in the Kibeho 
displacement camp in April 1995 by elements of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
Patriotic Army.  Most notable among these departures were (i) Prime Minister Faustin 
Twigaramungu, a Hutu of the MDR party in 1995; (ii) Interior Minister Seth 
Sendashonga a Hutu from the RPF in 1995; (iii) Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito, a 
Hutu in 1995; (iv) Minister of Information, Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma, a Hutu in 
1995; and (vi) the Minister of Transport and Communication, Immaculée Kayumba, a 
Tutsi again in 1995.  Later on, several other high-profile departures occurred: (i) 
Prime Minster Celestin Rwigema, a Hutu of the MDR party in 2000; (ii) President of 
the Transitional National Assembly, Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi in 2000; and (iii) 
President Pasteur Bizimungu, a senior Hutu in the RPF, in 2000.  Paul Kagame would 
replace Pasteur Bizimungu as President of the Republic.20  It is worth pointing out 
that the number of individuals who have left the transitional government may not be 
unusual in a period of 6 years - even when compared with mature democracies with 
coalition governments.  It may be a normal level of attrition.  However, it is also 
worth pointing out that of those listed above, three fled into exile, one was arrested 
and imprisoned, and one, Seth Sendashonga, was assassinated out-of-office – an 
assassination for which the RPF denies responsibility.  
At the non-elite level, there were also tensions.  The RPF immediately arrested 
en masse tens of thousands of Hutu accused of having participated in the genocide.  
At its height, Rwanda’s prison population numbered 120,000 individuals existing in 
extremely difficult living conditions.  Justice was an important issue.  In addition to 
                                                        
19 Rwanda’s President following the genocide was indeed Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, but 
it is important to remember that he was from the same political party as the Tutsi Vice-President, 
Paul Kagame.   
20 For a more detailed list of those who have left the government, see Lars Waldorf 
“Censorship and Propaganda in Post-Genocide Rwanda” in Allan Thompson, ed., The Media and the 
Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 404-416. 
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those who claimed they were innocent and wrongly-arrested, many also felt it was 
victor’s justice.  They alleged that war crimes had been committed by the RPF and 
went largely unpunished.  In addition, the prohibition on ethnicity meant that it was 
difficult to know or even publicly discuss to what extent important resources, such as 
government jobs and university educational scholarships for example, had been 
allocated fairly across the ethnic groups.  Such inequitable distribution had been a 
grievance since the colonial era.  The lack of transparency fuelled ethnic grievance as 
there were no data on ethnic allocation to counter the perception.  Tensions from the 
other side of the ethnic divide also emerged.  Genocide survivors felt they had not 
been properly compensated for their personal loss and suffering.21  All of these issues, 
perceived victor’s justice, perceived ethnic discrimination, and the adequate 
compensation of genocide survivors which have their origins in the transitional 
period, persist as political issues in Rwanda today.   
 
c. Medium-term Legitimacy and State-building 
Moving beyond the emergency conditions facing Rwanda immediately after 
the genocide, the government began to focus on recovery and reconstruction.  The 
RPF used the position of strength that it enjoyed within Rwanda from the outset to 
propose an ambitious economic program and to attempt quite radical social 
transformation, while at the same time was able to resist pressures for more rapid 
political liberalization.  The RPF was not only unconstrained domestically, but also to 
a large extent internationally.  The UN and important western nations had little 
leverage over the new government in large part due to their intransigence during the 
genocide.  As the army which ended the genocide, the RPF enjoyed a legitimacy 
internationally that few rebel groups which come to power through force ever could.   
To some extent, it is this limitation on international influence which has also 
facilitated indigenous institutional innovations such as gacaca,  ingando, and imihigo 
which I describe below.   
It is for the country’s economy that the Rwandan government has perhaps the 
most ambitious agenda.  While this economic reform cannot alone minimize the 
specific stresses which pushed Rwanda towards ethnic violence without 
accompanying social and political change, the list of achievements and of aims in this 
area is impressive and it is worth briefly recapping the most important ones here.22   
Economically then, Rwanda’s economy has grown at an impressive average of 
6%+ p.a. in GDP since the genocide, and in 2009 GDP stood at 512USD per capita.  
This compares with 173USD per capita for its cousin Burundi - also emerging from 
                                                        
21 See Survivors And Post-Genocide Justice In Rwanda:  Their Experiences, Perspectives and 
Hopes, African Rights and Redress, November 2008.   
22 The Government of Rwanda feels this view underestimates the centrality of economic 
security in promoting social stability.  See footnote 4 earlier for more detail.  Ethnic violence and 
indeed genocides of course have taken place in economically more prosperous countries than Rwanda 
including the UK (Northern Ireland), the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Germany for example.  The 
origins of ethnic violence lay in the structure of these countries’ politics and societies, rather than in the 
structure of their economies. 
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massive ethnic violence (albeit more recently).  Vision 2020, a government strategy 
document, aims for Rwanda to become a lower middle income country (900USD 
GDP/capita) by the year 2020, and the government has largely followed neo-liberal 
principles to achieve this.   Thus it has liberalized several sectors of the economy, 
notably through the introduction of competition in the telecoms industry, greater 
exposure of foreign exchange rates to the market, and the privatization of two state-
owned banks, the electricity utility, and PetroRwanda.  It has also sought to diversify 
its revenue base by promoting the service sector to reduce dependency on agriculture.  
The service sector represented a remarkable 46% of GDP, compared with 39.8% for 
agriculture and 14.2% for industry in 2007.   This is an significant and noteworthy 
shift in the structure of Rwanda’s economy.  Fiscally, the government has lowered the 
maximum tariff rate from 100% to 25% and eliminated export taxes to promote trade, 
lowered corporate tax from 35% to 30% to encourage foreign investment and the 
domestic private sector, introduced VAT to increase domestic revenues, and created 
the Rwanda Revenue Authority to better collect them.  The government has also 
promoted free trade and in 2004, Rwanda entered the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), a preferential trading area involving 19 states, and 
in 2007 joined the East African Community (EAC), a customs union involving 4 of its 
regional neighbours.    
Yet these impressive economic achievements are not without challenges.  
Foremost among them is the question of equity. The impressive GDP growth masks 
an unequal distribution of the benefits of this growth.  While in general poverty has 
slightly improved, inequality has grown.  Rwanda’s Gini co-efficient increased from 
0.47 in 2000 to 0.51 in 2005, and is high by global and African standards.23  
Moreover, poverty has not reduced much compared with the sizeable GDP growth.  A 
2000/2001 household living conditions survey (EICV I) found that 60.4% of the adult 
equivalent population lived below the national poverty line of 175 FRw/day.  A 
2005/6 survey (EICV II) found the figure only to be 56.9% with a poverty line set at 
250 FRw/day.24  In absolute terms – not controlling for population growth - poverty 
has in fact increased in the same time period from 4.82 million to 5.38 million people 
living below the poverty line.    
This inequality in Rwanda is most visible in the disparity between town and 
country.  Rural poverty is 67%, and an astounding 91% among households whose 
primary income is agricultural wage labour.25  Much of the benefit of Rwanda’s 
economic growth then has been concentrated in Rwanda’s towns, and primarily in 
Kigali, the capital.   As much of this growth has been service-sector led, and in 
particular in the sub-sectors of transportation, tourism, communications, education, 
and wholesale and retail trade, this urban concentration of the benefits is 
                                                        
23 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Rwanda:  FY09-FY12 
Washington DC: World Bank, 2008, pg. 5. 
24 International Monetary Fund: Rwanda: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy 2008 - 2012, Washington DC : IMF, 2008, pg.30 
25 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Rwanda:  FY09-FY12, pg. 5. 
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unsurprising.26  Although the data do not support further disaggregation, my view is 
that there is likely to be significant inequalities within towns themselves, with much 
of the wealth concentrated in the hands of a relatively small business elite.    
It is not only income inequality but also educational inequality between town 
and country that is remarkable.  While primary enrolments rates were 90.4% in the 
capital and 85.4% in rural areas, the disparity rises to an astonishing 29.1% and 7.9% 
respectively for secondary enrolment rates in 2005.27  Education and training are 
essential for the realization of the government’s goal of a more knowledge and 
service-based economy as articulated in Vision 2020.  Yet there is a significant gap 
here.  Primary education has been free since 2003 and a little under two thirds of the 
population completes some primary education.  However, only 3.5% of the population 
completes secondary education, and only 0.4% completes tertiary education.28  
Rwandans will simply not be able to get off the farm if enrolment rates at the 
secondary and tertiary levels do not rise.   Although the service sector has now 
surpassed agriculture in its contribution to Rwanda’s GDP, agriculture continues to be 
the greatest source of jobs for Rwandans.  Data on jobs is generally poor in Rwanda 
and the Ministry of Public Service and Labour acknowledges the challenge it faces of 
tracking employment levels and trends across all sectors of the economy, not least 
because of the size of the informal sector.     
Having said this, spatial inequality between town and country is unlikely to 
place the direct stress on a country that would push it towards ethnic violence.  
Horizontal inequality – that is inequality between social groups - is, however, a 
potentially greater source of stress.  In Rwanda, there is a high correlation between 
spatial and horizontal inequality as Rwanda’s poorer rural periphery is comprised 
overwhelmingly of Hutu smallholders.  The existence of horizontal inequality – real 
or perceived - creates ethnic grievances which may be instrumentalized during 
periods of political opportunity by elite ethnic entrepreneurs.  In Rwanda the 
government has outlawed ethnic identification making it difficult to know or even to 
discuss openly whether Tutsi have been favoured over Hutu in the allocation of public 
sector and para-statal jobs, or in educational places and overseas scholarships.  
Historically, the unequal distribution of such opportunities has been a powerful ethnic 
grievance in Rwanda.  The over-representation of Tutsi in government jobs and 
educational placements was a fact in colonial Rwanda, and persisted to a significant 
extent post-independence, causing protests which brought down the First Republic in 
1973.  However, high-profile political appointments – Ministers, Prefects, and 
Burgomasters for example – went overwhelmingly to Hutu in the period following 
independence and before the genocide.  The introduction of ethnic quotas did not 
resolve the problem, and instead simply provoked further inter-ethnic contestation 
over the reporting of the size of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa populations in the 1978 and 
1991 census data.  The inability today to even discuss ethnic distribution does nothing 
                                                        
26 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda website, http://www.statistics.gov.rw, accessed 
March 10th 2010. 
27 IMF, Rwanda: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008 – 2012,  
pg.166. 
28 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Rwanda:  FY09-FY12, pg. 10. 
Horizontal 
inequality 
 16 
 
to rebut continuing popular perceptions of ethnic discrimination and ethnic 
inequality.29  This perception extends to the provision of other public goods such as 
justice.  As mentioned earlier, the exclusion of allegations of war crimes committed 
by the RPF against the Hutu population from Rwanda’s transitional justice process, 
gacaca, is a longstanding grievance of the Hutu community.  Having said this, 
inequality and ethnic discrimination do not by themselves inevitably lead to inter-
group violence.  As mentioned, the distribution of resources between ethnic groups 
has been a relatively constant source of grievance in both the colonial and pre-
genocide periods of Rwanda’s history.  Yet it has been only when they have coincided 
with the emergence of particular macro-political opportunities – such as sudden shifts 
towards competitive, multi-party politics - that they have come to threaten social 
stability in Rwanda.    
In addition to these equity concerns, a further challenge to Rwanda’s 
economic achievements has been the source of the country’s impressive growth.  In 
2001, a UN investigation into the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) published a report suggesting links between 
members of the Rwandan military and civilian regime and private entities involved in 
the export of cassiterite, coltan, gold, and diamonds among other minerals from the 
DRC.30  This report raises not only questions relating to the ethics, but also to the 
sustainability of Rwanda’s growth.   On the question of sustainability, however, it is 
important to attempt to put the contribution of such minerals to the country’s GDP 
into perspective, recognizing that it is difficult to do this accurately as the data 
available are not readily verifiable independently.31   In 2009 Rwanda’s GDP was 
estimated to be 5.2 billion USD.32  In comparison, its two most important mineral 
exports, cassiterite and coltan, were valued at 28.6 million USD and 20.2 million 
USD respectively in the same year.33   Even if one assumed that none of these exports 
                                                        
29 The Government of Rwanda disagrees that its prohibition on ethnic identification 
masked a pro-Tutsi bias in the allocation of public sector jobs and other opportunities.  It writes ‘the 
report makes much of the question of fairness in distribution of goods, services and entitlements across 
ethnic groups. It misses out the fact that in constitutional terms, the issue of fairness on basis of 
individual merit is central.’  
30 See Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations, April 2001.   
31 The UN Experts’ report on illegal exploitation in the DRC, published back in 2001, 
relied on data provided by independent organizations as well as by national governments to 
identify a discrepancy between the value of mineral production and mineral exports for several 
of the DRC’s neighbouring countries.  Today, data may be more difficult to establish 
independently for Rwanda.  The National Bank of Rwanda publishes detailed data on the volume 
and value of Rwanda’s exports.  The US geological survey publishes annual Mineral Yearbooks 
listing the mineral production of countries around the world.  In its latest Yearbook for Africa 
(2008), it does not cite a source for data on Rwandan mineral production, but it does 
acknowledge the data for 19 other countries were provided by their governments.   
32 IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2010.  Accessed online February 
2011.   
33 National Bank of Rwanda, data released June 2010.http://www.bnr.rw/statistics.aspx 
Accessed online February 2011.   
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was the result of production from inside Rwanda, the contribution of these two 
exports would represent less than 1% of GDP.  If one took the data from the UN 
report instead, which obtained an independent estimate of Rwanda’s diamond exports, 
in their highest year (2000) diamond exports were worth 1.8 million USD compared 
to a GDP of 1.7 billion USD.34   
These issues notwithstanding, Rwanda’s economic progress since the 
genocide is nonetheless remarkable, and due in large part to the position of strength 
the RPF holds vis-à-vis Rwandan society and vis-à-vis its political opponents.    This 
strength can in turn be traced both to the RPF military victory and to the leadership of 
Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s President and RPF Chairman.  However, all of the economic 
advances outlined above remain vulnerable unless there is also a transformation of 
Rwandan society.   I have discussed at length earlier the possibility of achieving a 
post-ethnic society in Rwanda, and will focus here instead on three other social 
innovations designed to promote social cohesion:  gacaca, ingando, and 
umushyikirano.  
Gacaca was an innovative and largely indigenous response to a highly unusual 
challenge that Rwanda faced as a post-conflict country:  mass violence in which a 
sizeable segment of the population had been involved, and of which a sizeable 
segment had been the victims.  While it has attracted criticism, the overwhelming 
rationale for gacaca was and remains quite simply the absence of any better 
alternative.  Having first attempted to use the formal judicial system for 5 years, it 
became apparent that it would take over one hundred years to process the 120,000 odd 
detainees in Rwanda’s prisons.  As a result, the Rwandan government chose to adapt a 
traditional, customary institution to the practical challenge of providing transitional 
justice in post-genocide Rwanda, and gacaca has retributive and restorative justice as 
its goals:  punishment and reconciliation.   As a form of transitional justice then, it is 
remarkably ambitious and the Rwandan government should be commended for its 
willingness not only to end impunity, but also to heal a divided society.  Few 
countries have moved so quickly after a civil war to deal with the social 
consequences.  Piloted from 2002, gacaca was scheduled to draw to a close at the end 
of 2009:  a social experiment of less than a decade, and initiated less than a decade 
after the violence.     
Gacaca works essentially as a form of community justice and the law 
governing it has undergone several revisions.  Today, while the most serious crimes – 
broadly the organization and planning of the genocide, and acts of genocide 
committed or encouraged by those who held high public or quasi-public office – are 
tried by ordinary civilian and military jurisdictions, all others crimes are tried by 
gacaca jurisdictions. 35  These gacaca jurisdictions comprise three levels. The lowest 
level, the cell court, is competent to try crimes against property, the sector court is 
competent to try mainly crimes against the person, and finally there is an appeal court.  
Each of these three levels of jurisdiction is led by a bench of 7 persons of integrity 
                                                        
34 IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2010.   
35 There are in fact three broad categories of genocide crimes and crimes against humanity.  
For the full enumeration of actions which are criminalized in each category of crime, see Article 9 of 
Rwanda’s Organic Law No. 13/2008.   
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(Inyangamugayo in Kinyarwanda) and 2 deputies elected from the general assembly.  
The general assembly itself is drawn from members of the local community aged 18 
and over. 
What assessment to make of gacaca?  As an important new, local institution in 
the field of transitional justice, gacaca has attracted considerable attention from the 
scholarly and policy community.   While it obviously does not purport to meet 
international standards of justice, it has nonetheless been the subject of several other 
criticisms, and I summarize the most important ones here:36   (i) Gacaca is victor’s 
justice:  War crimes have been explicitly excluded from the competence of gacaca 
courts, thus leaving allegations of RPF crimes committed during the civil war and 
genocide unaddressed in the minds of the Hutu community;37  (ii) Gacaca does not 
offer proper redress for victims of sexual violence:  Given the stigma attached to such 
crimes for the victims, fewer have been reported to the community than have 
occurred;  (iii) Gacaca has limited support from the population:  Gacaca courts have 
suffered from low participation levels from the community, and the need for the state 
to enforce attendance from above has raised questions of to what extent restorative 
justice is being fulfilled and to what extent gacaca could be fairly described as a local, 
customary institution; (iv) Gacaca has led to the perversion of justice;  While we do 
not have systematic evidence of how widespread the problems are, research has 
suggested that false accusations have been made to settle personal scores, false 
confessions made to receive lower sentences, witnesses intimidated; and deals struck 
leading to the acquittal of guilty individuals.  (v) Gacaca does not provide 
restitutionary justice:  As gacaca courts were not explicitly mandated to provide 
restitution, survivors of the genocide feel inadequately compensated for their loss and 
suffering.38  
 Some of these criticisms are justifiable, as at least some of these problems 
identified could have been resolved through reform without giving up on the idea of 
using gacaca altogether.  However, perhaps more significantly the alternatives – short 
of a strategy of pursuing leaders-only - were impractical.  Neither formal tribunals nor 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) could have handled the sheer scale of 
the challenge.   Gacaca combined both functions into one - a pragmatic hybrid 
institution.   While gacaca falls short of standards of due process associated with 
formal criminal tribunals, it has been argued in its favour that it goes further than a 
                                                        
36 For a more detailed discussion of these criticisms, see Penal Reform International. 
Integrated Report on Gacaca Research and Monitoring: Pilot Phase January 2002 - December 2004. 
2005; and Waldorf, Lars. Mass Justice for Mass Atrocities: Re-Thinking Local Justice as Transitional 
Justice. Temple Law Review 79, no. 1 (2006).  
 
37 This decision may have been motivated by both a desire to protect RPF combatants who 
loyally fought in the civil war and by a desire not to equate the genocide of the Tutsi with ‘lesser’ war 
crimes.  However, a calculation of whether these interests are more important than the competing 
interests of justice and social cohesion needs to be undertaken by the Rwandan government.   
38 In 1998 a survivor’s fund, the FARG, was established and today provides education, health, 
and housing assistance to genocide survivors.  It has, however, received criticism for being slow to 
provide support, and for providing inadequate levels of support.   In addition, the ability of Gacaca 
courts to prescribe community service as a punishment has benefited some survivors whose homes 
have been re-built 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission.   Gacaca brings together survivors and 
perpetrators face-to-face and does so in a local space. 39   However, it is unclear 
whether this form of confrontation, given the emotions in play and what is at stake, is 
necessarily superior to a TRC.  Similarly, the absence of individuals to adjudicate 
from outside the community implies reliance on local judges who will be exposed to 
influences from within the community.    
It is difficult to assess the strategic effectiveness of gacaca at this point in time 
given that it is only now drawing to a close.  However, my sense is that it will have 
been less successful in achieving its goal of restorative justice than its goal of 
retributive justice.  Rather than a sincere and meaningful reconciliation, gacaca will 
have produced a non-violent co-existence between Hutu and Tutsi enforced largely by 
their awareness that the state wishes a post-ethnic society and national unity.  With 
respect to retributive justice, it is of course unlikely gacaca will have punished all the 
guilty and acquitted all the innocent, and grievances will I suspect continue to 
circulate within communities in the post-gacaca period.     
Ingando is a second local, traditional institution which has been resurrected 
from Rwanda’s past and as with gacaca adapted by the government to promote inter-
ethnic reconciliation and national unity within Rwanda.   Essentially, it involves the 
re-education of Rwandan society.   Rwandans live together in residential ‘solidarity 
camps’ in groups often several hundred strong and for periods from several days to 
several weeks where they study a variety of topics:  challenges facing Rwanda; the 
history of Rwanda; political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda and Africa; and the 
rights and duties of leadership.   Originally aimed at Tutsi returnees and ex-
combatants, separate ingando programs have also been organized for secondary and 
university students, génocidaires, gacaca judges, survivors, community leaders, 
informal traders, prostitutes, and others.  Responsibility for ingando currently lies 
with the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and it is being implemented 
nationwide.40   
Ingando has received much less attention than gacaca, and less is known 
about the actual and long-term impact on each of the diverse groups it targets.41  
However, it does have the potential to shape Rwandan society in a meaningful and 
lasting way – particularly for the younger generation whose political consciousness 
had not already been activated by the time of the genocide.    Ingando is currently a 
means of presenting viewpoints and information from the state to society:  from those 
above to those below.   However, it could also be a space where the plurality of views 
from within Rwandan society – including undesirable ones - may be aired and 
possibly differences resolved in a controlled setting, rather than on the hills where 
                                                        
39 See Clark, Phil, and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds. After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press and London, UK: C. Hurst & Co, 2008, pg. 314. 
40 Information taken from Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’s 
website, http://www.nurc.gov.rw, accessed March 10th 2010.   
41 An exception is Chi Mgbako, Ingando, Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political 
Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2005) 
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they may be expressed more passionately.  This is particularly important with respect 
to the issues of ethnicity and responsibility for Rwanda’s ethnic violence.  In addition, 
ingando could encourage Rwandans to think independently and critically about their 
past.  If Rwandans are instead trained to accept there is a single narrative which 
comes from the ‘high authorities’, there is nothing to stop another government from 
teaching them something different (and more dangerous) in the future.  For example, 
ingando today emphasizes that Hutu and Tutsi co-existed happily until the advent of 
colonialism when the Belgians set them against each other.   In contrast, the narrative 
taught in schools before the genocide was that Tutsi had historically oppressed Hutu 
and that they were alien to Rwanda.  In the absence of critical thinking, a different 
government could in principle re-instill such a narrative of Rwanda’s past.   
In short, ingando is an institution with potential for promoting social cohesion 
in a post-conflict setting if conceptualized a little differently.   However, it should be 
noted that ingando, as with gacaca, is possible in Rwanda mainly because of the 
strength of the Rwandan state to mobilize and organize the entire population.  It may 
be more difficult to reproduce in a state with weaker capacity, a higher and more 
dispersed population, and a larger territory.     
Umushyikirano, Rwanda’s annual National Dialogue, like ingando, represents 
another indigenous innovation with the potential to make a meaningful socio-political 
impact.  Inaugurated in 2002, the National Dialogue comprises a two-day conference 
in which several hundred key figures from Rwanda’s central and local government, as 
well as from political and civil society, come together to engage in public debate.  Its 
National Dialogue in 2009 for the first time also involved ordinary Rwandans, who 
had the opportunity to participate via telephones and text messaging, and also to 
follow the debate online and through the radio.  The Government of Rwanda sees the 
National Dialogue then as a space for the expression of the diversity of views within 
Rwanda that is appropriate for an ethnically-divided society.  It allows for the airing 
of issues without the volatility and intensity implied by multi-party politics and free 
media in a society where the memory of ethnic violence persists.   At present, the 
agenda – the issues which come up for discussion – does not explicitly address 
politically sensitive subjects such as accountability for war crimes committed by RPF 
combatants or the continuing salience of ethnicity in Rwandan society.   However, in 
time, as Rwandan society and Rwandan politics matures, even such controversial 
issues may be tackled.   What umushyikirano cannot become, however, is a permanent 
substitute for the freedom of political parties and the freedom of the press, as I 
describe next.   
Politically, in contrast with its transformative economic and social programs, 
the RPF has been diffident about political liberalization.  The regime’s diffidence is 
based on two central beliefs: (i) competitive, multi-party politics leads to ethnic 
polarization; and (ii) democratic elections, given Rwanda’s unusual bi-ethnic 
demography, carry the risk of empowering a Hutu majoritarian government and thus 
exposing its Tutsi minority to renewed persecution.  Instead the RPF’s stated aim is 
‘consensus democracy’ – where minority views cannot be ignored by a vote-winning 
majority - rather than ‘competitive politics’.  However, some of its actions have been 
criticized for inconsistency with either of these political ideals, in particular its heavy 
constraints on the freedom of Rwanda’s political and civil society as I shall describe 
below.   
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In 2003, at the end of Rwanda’s long, nine year transition, local, legislative, 
and Presidential elections were finally held – along with a popular referendum on a 
new constitution.   This is in contrast with most mediated settlements to civil wars 
where elections are often held early in order to legitimize the government.  As a result 
of the elections, Paul Kagame was re-elected President with 95.1% of the vote for a 
seven year term, and the RPF obtained 33 of the 80 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
making it the single largest party in the legislature.   In fact, under the new 
Constitution only 53 seats are directly contested through popular election, and 27 are 
reserved for special groups:  24 seats are reserved for women elected locally across 
the country, 2 are elected from the National Youth Council, and 1 from the Federation 
of the Associations for the Disabled.   The RPF entered into a coalition with 4 other 
minor parties, thereby controlling 40 seats or 50% of the Chamber, the maximum 
permitted under the constitution for a party.42   
Rwanda’s constitution is a remarkable piece of institutional design.  On the 
positive side, it clearly articulates a comprehensive set of civil and political rights for 
Rwandans, explicitly recognizes principles of ethnic equality, equitable power-
sharing, and democracy, and creates a more equitable balance-of-power between the 
Presidency and the Legislature.43  It also establishes a multiplicity of institutions, 
which have been given important competences, and which in theory should be 
independent of the Executive.  In addition to a bicameral legislature and judiciary 
then, the constitution establishes a National Commission for Human Rights, a 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a National Electoral Commission, an 
Ombudsman, and a Gender Monitoring office among others.   On the other hand, 
consistent with the fear that competitive, multiparty politics may elicit ethnic 
extremism from within Rwandan society, the constitution provides for the control of 
political parties by the Judiciary (upon receiving a complaint from the Senate).  
Parties deemed to be based on ethnic, racial, tribal or other proscribed divisions, or 
deemed to be destabilizing to the nation may be suspended or dissolved.44   Similarly, 
while the constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, opinion, religion, 
and worship, in the same article it proscribes propaganda deemed to be discriminatory 
on ethnic, racial, or regional grounds.  These constitutional provisions reflect the 
government’s concern with allowing Rwanda’s political and civil society to operate 
unchecked.   Notwithstanding their design, the institutions created, when compared 
with their counterparts in other sub-Saharan countries, enjoy a remarkably high level 
of administrative capability and bureaucratic efficiency.    
However, it is the independence rather than the effectiveness of Rwanda’s 
institutions which is cause for concern.  The government has drawn on its laws 
proscribing ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘sectarianism’ in its management of political and 
                                                        
42 The four other parties are: (i) the Christian Democratic Party (PDC, 3 seats); (ii) the Islamic 
Democratic Party (PDI, 2 seats); the Democratic Union of the Rwandan People (UPDR, 1 seat); and 
(iv) the Rwandan Socialist Party (PSR, 1 seat).   
43 Article 108 states that the Legislature can now override the President’s objections to 
ordinary laws with a two-thirds majority 
44 Articles 52, 53, and 54 of Rwanda’s Constitution set out the precise grounds on which a 
political party may be warned, suspended or dissolved.   
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civil society, and it is very sensitive to allegations that it is misusing these powers for 
personal, party, or ethnic advantage.   Thus, the 2003 elections were criticized by the 
EU Observer Mission which stated that ‘accusations of separatism and divisionism, 
which are grave in the Rwandan context, had a tendency to be used as arguments for 
limiting the freedom of speech of political opponents during the election 
campaigns.’45  Three political parties were banned in the run-up to the elections, and 
Faustin Twigaramungu, the leader of the main opposition party, the MDR, was 
compelled to run as an independent, securing only 3.6% of the Presidential vote.  
Similarly, Pasteur Bizimingu, Rwanda’s first President after the genocide, left the 
government in 2000 to form his own political party, the Democratic Party for 
Renewal – Ubuyanga, but it was immediately banned, and Bizimungu subsequently 
arrested and convicted in 2004 for inciting rebellion and plotting to overthrow the 
government.  The 2010 Presidential elections, which resulted in 93.1% of the votes 
for the incumbent President Kagame, engendered even stronger criticism.46  Two 
important opposition parties, the FDU-Inkingi and the Democratic Green Party, were 
unable to hold the meetings necessary for registration to participate in the election.  
The leader of the former party, Victoire Ingabire, was arrested in April 2010 on 
charges, inter alia, of promoting genocide ideology, and the Vice-President of the 
latter party, André Rwisekera (who had defected from the ruling party), was killed by 
assassins unknown in July 2010.   A third political party, the PS-Imberakuri, was able 
to register but its President, Bernard Ntaganda, was arrested ahead of the election also 
on charges of divisionism.   
The RPF has taken a similar position towards civil society.  One of the 
country’s main human rights organizations, LIPRODHOR, was dissolved in 2004, to 
be re-opened with a quite different management.  Many of its members left the 
country not to return.  Various journalists and newspaper editors critical of the 
government have also left the country.  Prominent among these departures were 
Umuseso’s founding editor, John Mugabi, who sought asylum overseas after 
publishing an article which claimed to reveal Rwandan involvement in the 
exploitation of natural resources in the DRC; and Umuco’s editor Bonaventure 
Bizumuremyi who left Rwanda in August 2006 following a ruling by the 
government’s High Council of the Press that several Umuco articles had violated the 
Constitution, the 2002 Press Law, and the Code of Professional Ethics.  In the run-up 
to the 2010 Presidential elections, the High Press Council shut down some 30 media 
outlets for failure to comply with a 2009 media law.  In June 2010, a journalist, Jean-
Leonard Rugambage, who worked for the Umuvugizi newspaper, was shot dead in 
Kigali after Umuvugizi published a story alleging that Rwandan intelligence officials 
were linked to the attempted assassination of an exiled Rwandan general, Kayumba 
Nyamwasa.47  Radio, which remains the most important means of communication in 
Rwanda given the relatively high level of illiteracy, has in contrast largely been 
                                                        
45 European Union Electoral Observation Mission, Rwanda (Final Report): Presidential 
Election 25th August 2003 and Legislative Elections 29th and 30th September 2003, Brussels, European 
Union, 2003.  
46 See Amnesty International’s Press Release, Rwanda: Pre-election attacks on politicians 
and journalists condemned, August 5th 2010. 
47 Press release, Amnesty International,August 5th 2010.   
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unaffected by government interference.  To its credit, the government approved 
licenses for private radio and television stations – albeit after the 2003 elections - and 
today 16 radio stations operate on Rwanda’s airwaves.  However, most of the private 
stations have confined themselves largely to providing entertainment, though a few 
are increasing their discussions of current affairs.48  Television broadcasting, in 
contrast, remains a government monopoly.  The absence of independent radio 
covering political affairs is telling and may illustrate the power of self-censorship in 
Rwanda.   
If the government’s critics are correct that the regime has misused laws on 
genocide ideology and sectarianism to control political society and media laws to 
constrain civil society, then this misuse exemplifies the importance of strengthening 
the independence of institutions from the ruling party.  If the government is correct 
that journalists and opposition politicians are crossing the boundary between healthy, 
legitimate dissent and divisive, irresponsible behavior, this exemplifies the need for 
maturation of Rwanda’s political culture.  In part this may be due to a lack of training 
in responsible journalism and experience in party politics and so may be partly 
addressed through capacity workshops for journalists and the passage of time for 
politicians.   However, the best strategy for improving the accountability of the ruling 
elite for the misuse of laws and the accountability of opposition politicians for 
irresponsible rhetoric is to gradually increase political space inside Rwanda.  It 
encourages mutual scrutiny and obviates the need for the concentration of power in 
the hands of the Executive/President - a feature of all of Rwanda’s previous regimes 
which have all ended extra-constitutionally.  Indeed the current Government of 
Rwanda itself had recognized the importance of institutional independence in its own 
governance assessment conducted jointly with donors. 49 
Rwanda’s institutions generally operate according to rules, but there will 
always be a need to look for ways to strengthen rule-based governance, reduce 
potential for individual discretion and abuse of power, and thereby enhance the 
resilience of institutions charged with upholding the rule of law. 
It is in the government’s strategic long-term self-interest then to change the 
political culture and to also teach - by setting the example itself - Rwandan civil and 
political society the importance of using their powers responsibly.   
 
d. Regional and International Dimensions 
In the period 1992-4, the international community engaged with Rwanda’s 
civil war in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reach a negotiated settlement to it.  
During the genocide (the culmination of the civil war), however, the international 
community disengaged.  This disengagement permitted the war to end through 
                                                        
48 See Rwanda:  Joint Governance Assessment Report, Kigali, Rwanda, 2008, pg. 42 and Lars 
Waldorf, Censorship and Propaganda in Post-Genocide Rwanda in Allan Thompson, ed., The Media 
and the Rwanda Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 404-416 
49 Rwanda:  Joint Governance Assessment Report, Kigali, Rwanda, 2008, pg. 18. 
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outright military victory for the rebel group.   It also meant that a genocide would be 
perpetrated with little international action to prevent and stop it.   
Much has been written on the subject of the responsibility of external actors – 
particularly the United Nations, France, the United States, and Belgium - for the 
genocide.  However, I want to highlight two consequences of this international 
disengagement on the course of Rwanda’s post-war transition.  First, the inaction 
during the genocide prompted a massive influx of technical and financial assistance 
after the genocide.  Rwanda remains highly aid-dependent, and I discuss the 
implications of this in a later section.  Second, it has meant that these external actors 
have been reluctant to comment critically on the policies of Rwanda’s new 
government.  The government is comprised mainly of the rebel group which ended 
the genocide, and it consequently enjoyed a high level of legitimacy internationally.    
Given the inaction of external actors during the genocide, they are understandably 
concerned with the perception of their entitlement to criticize the post-genocide 
government.  Despite the devastation wrought on its people and its infrastructure, 
Rwanda did not have a UN mission to help administer its transition from war as for 
example occurred in East Timor and Kosovo.  The mandate of UNAMIR II, the small 
UN mission on the ground, was limited mainly to humanitarian assistance and to 
support to the government in its policy of national reconciliation.  Its operations ended 
in March 1996, less than 2 years after the genocide.   Instead, the new government has 
largely charted an autonomous path of its choosing in the wake of the genocide.   
The reluctance on the part of external actors to speak out against the policies 
of the new regime thought problematic applied not only to internal matters, but also to 
the regime’s foreign affairs.  The new regime was directly involved in two military 
campaigns in the DRC, the first of which (1996-7) toppled Mobutu, and the second 
(1998-2002) left eastern Congo in a state of chronic insecurity.  In 2010, the Rwandan 
regime faced and denied charges which emerged from a UN-backed investigation into 
crimes committed during those wars.50  Members of the Rwandan regime had also 
been implicated earlier in a UN-sponsored investigation into the exploitation of 
natural resources in the east.51   Rwanda for its part has responded by stating that its 
interventions were undertaken to protect a Tutsi minority, the Banyamulenge, living 
in eastern Congo and to hunt down the remainder of the génocidaires, and not to 
secure its financial interests in the region.  Nonetheless, Rwanda’s actions damaged 
relations with its neighbours, notably Uganda and the DRC.52  The balance of power 
in the region as a result remains unstable since the genocide and renewed inter-state 
confrontation – most likely through rebel proxy groups again – remains a possibility 
                                                        
50  See Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic  Republic 
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, United Nations, New York, 2010 
 
51 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations, New York, 2003. 
52 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report for Rwanda, August 2009, pg.10. 
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that should not be ruled out.  Recently, however, there has been a rapprochement 
between Kigali on the one hand, and Kampala and Kinshasa on the other.53   
There are also strong regional dimensions to conflict within Africa’s Great 
Lakes more generally.  The weakness of the region’s international borders has meant 
that refugees, combatants, weapons, and natural resources have all been able to move 
quite freely across them.   These spillover effects have potential destabilizing effects 
on the neighbouring countries affected.  The region’s physical geography has also 
facilitated conflict, in particular guerrilla insurgency in eastern Congo.  The terrain – a 
mix of mountains and forests with a limited road network – has made it an ideal safe 
haven for rebel groups to operate beyond the reaches of their opponents.  The 
availability of easily-extractable resources such as coltan, cassiterite, and gold in the 
DRC has also attracted the interest of its neighbours, as well as sustained rebel groups 
materially.   Thus, during Rwanda’s civil war, the RPF itself used the sanctuary 
afforded by the Virunga National Park on the border with the then Zaire.  Today, the 
RPF’s main military opponent, the FDLR operates in eastern DRC.  During Burundi’s 
civil war, the rebel groups CNDD and Palipehutu-FNL both operated in eastern DRC.   
It is these characteristics of the region – weak borders, terrain favourable to 
insurgency, and the abundance of lootable resources – which have amplified the 
spillover effects of violence in the area.   
 
e. Measuring Results and Outcomes 
It is worth summarizing the impact the genocide had on Rwanda to establish 
the baseline against which post-genocide progress can be measured.  
The genocide cost the lives of somewhere between 507,000 and nearly 1 
million Rwandans, overwhelmingly of Tutsi ethnicity, but also of Hutu ethnic 
origin.54   It sent a further 1 – 2 million Rwandans, overwhelmingly Hutu, over 
Rwanda’s borders, mainly into eastern Congo where many perished of disease and 
malnutrition as refugees, and also in attempts to forcibly dismantle the refugee camps 
where Rwanda’s génocidaires had sought sanctuary.    
Yet it is not only those who died who should be mentioned here, but also those 
who survived.   Rwanda’s survivors count particularly high proportions of several 
socially vulnerable groups among them.  Widows, orphans, and the disabled all 
struggle in the wake of the genocide.  In addition, a sizeable proportion of the country 
                                                        
53 In 2009-10 for example, Rwanda and the DRC conducted joint military operations against 
the FDLR, a rebel group dedicated to the overthrow of the Rwandan regime, and operating in eastern 
Congo.    
54 Human Rights Watch commissioned a demographer to calculate the number of Tutsi killed, 
using a baseline population extrapolated from Rwanda’s 1991 Population Census, and established the 
estimate of 507,000.  See Des Forges, Alison. Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in Rwanda: 
Human Rights Watch; International Federation for Human Rights, 1999.   The Government of 
Rwanda’s 2002 genocide census identified by name 934,218 victims of whom it claims 93.7% (or 
approximately 875,000) were Tutsi.  See Ministère de l'Administration Locale et des Affaires Sociales, 
"Dénombrement Des Victimes Du Génocide”, 2002.  
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had witnessed violence, and the long-term psycho-social effects of such trauma on 
individual welfare have yet to be properly researched but should not be 
underestimated.   There is also a shortage of men in Rwanda as a result of the 
genocide.  In 2002, for every 100 women, there were only 91.5 men.  Before the 
genocide in 1991, there were 95.1 men for every 100 women.55   In 2005, 34% of all 
households were female-headed, compared with only 21% before the genocide in 
1992.56  In addition, 120,000 Rwandans – overwhelmingly men - were arrested and 
detained in Rwanda’s prison system for involvement in the genocide, further straining 
Rwandan society.  In short, the human impact of the genocide left the country’s 
government, economy, and society stripped of many needed individuals:  managers 
and technocrats to run vital public services, businessmen and professionals essential 
for internal commerce, and parents and spouses to maintain the family unit.  The 
genocide of course also caused enormous damage to inter-ethnic relations between 
Hutu and Tutsi.     
How then has Rwanda performed since the genocide?  Overall, it has been a 
remarkable recovery – sustained even beyond the initial uptick to be expected 
following the restart of the economy.  According to the Rotberg and Gisselquist Index 
of African Governance, 2009, a comprehensive composite measure of governance in 
Africa, Rwanda’s governance has overall improved from a score of 47.1 out of 100 in 
2000 (ranked 39th out of 53 countries) to a score of 58.6 out of 100 in 2007 (ranked 
26th out of 53 countries).  The Index measures governance on five dimensions, and 
between 2000 and 2007 Rwanda improved its aggregate scores (scaled out of 100) on 
all 5 dimensions:   
(i) Safety and Security (from 91.4 to 98.3);  
(ii) Rule of Law, Transparency, and Corruption (from 46.7 to 48.4);  
(iii) Participation and Human Rights (from 25.4 to 68.4);  
(iv) Sustainable Economic Opportunity (from 32.8 to 35.1); and  
(v) Human Development (from 39.1 to 42.9).   
In fact, across the 55 individual indicators reported in the Index, Rwanda’s 
score either remained the same or improved in 45 of them between 2000 and 2007.   
Table 1 summarizes Rwanda’s performance in all 55 indicators.  The scores have 
been scaled to allow comparison across time, and signs reversed appropriately so that 
a higher score on any indicator is always better.   Rwanda’s achievements in short are 
impressive.   
                                                        
55 Commission Nationale de Récensement, "Récensement Général de la Population de 
l'Habitat au Août 1991:  Résultats Définitifs," (Kigali, Rwanda: Ministère du Plan, 1994) and National 
Census Service, “The General Census of the Population and Housing Rwanda : 16 – 30th August 
2002”, (Kigali, Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2002).     
56 Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2005, National Institute of Statistics and the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kigali, Rwanda, 2005. 
Interpretation of 
performance 
data 
Strategic 
assessment of 
post-conflict 
performance 
 27 
 
Yet there are several points to be made in interpreting some of the Index’s 
findings.  First, relative to other sub-Saharan countries, Rwanda is indeed one of the 
most safe and most secure on the continent.  This has much to do with the 
historically-rooted power of the Rwandan state relative to Rwandan society and I 
explain the origins of this power later.   The state’s security apparatus is more than 
capable of managing Rwanda’s internal and external security challenges.  The 
Rwandan Defence Forces are a modern, well-equipped, and combat-hardened army 
and one of the most professional in Africa, numbering 33,000 in 2009.57  The 
government is confident of its security position.  Government data indicate that 
40,000 soldiers have been demobilized since 2000, and military expenditures reduced 
from an estimated 4.3% of GDP in 1998 to 1.6% in 2007.58  Government data also 
show the GoR has processed 6000 FDLR and other militia fighters as well as over 
21,000 ex-FAR (former government soliders) returnees.  Rwanda’s police are also a 
visible and felt presence throughout Rwanda’s local communities.  The Rwandan 
National Police number 6000, and the Local Defence forces 90,000.   There is also the 
National Security Service which relies on a very effective network of informants 
within society.  In short, ordinary Rwandans know then that their activities are 
monitored, and the high level of policing accounts for the high degree of social 
control.  It is unsurprising that Rwanda’s homicide rate is low at 6.1 per 100,000 in 
2008.59   It is worth noting, however, that a high degree of social control may also be 
used for pernicious ends, as the genocide itself vividly illustrated.   
Second, the significant improvement in Rwanda’s Participation and Human 
Rights score is primarily attributable to the holding of its first Presidential and 
Legislative elections in 2003.   The Index classified these elections as ‘partially free 
and fair’.  However, the aggregation and weighting of this measure obscures several 
other significant negative trends.  Thus, on the civil rights indicator – which measures 
government respect for 12 distinct civil rights on a scale from 0 to 12 – Rwanda’s raw 
score declined from 6 to 4 between 2000 and 2007.  Similarly, Rwanda’s performance 
on press freedom – which is drawn from the Reporters without Borders Worldwide 
Press Freedom Index – shows Rwanda’s scaled score declined from 70.7 to 51.1 out 
of 100 between 2000 and 2007.   Much of these declines can be traced to the 
significant limitations on freedom of speech in Rwanda.  In particular, critics claim 
Rwanda’s laws on genocide ideology and sectarianism have been abused.   Overly-
zealous loyalists of the ruling party have used them against individuals critical of the 
RPF and the President.   Otherwise legitimate and healthy dissent may effectively be 
criminally punished.  Certainly, this law does undermine the perception of the rule of 
law in Rwanda.  It violates the principle of legal certainty as an individual cannot 
know with certainty whether his actions are illegal, and exposes the government to 
accusations of using the law to prosecute its political opponents.  It would be 
circumspect then to at least reform this law.   
                                                        
57 The Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2010, pg. 
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58 Rwanda:  Joint Governance Assessment Report, Kigali, Rwanda, 2008, pg. 20 
59 Rwanda:  Joint Governance Assessment Report, Kigali, Rwanda, 2008, pg. 22 
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Third, related to the previous point, the Rule of Law, Transparency, and 
Corruption measure does not capture how power is de facto exercised in Rwanda.  For 
example, Rwanda’s ambitious program of decentralization has been much heralded - 
not least because it appears to go against the historical practice in Rwanda of 
concentrating power at the centre.60   Yet there is reason to be cautious in drawing 
conclusions.    Rwanda has an extraordinary state machinery at the local level:  5 
administrative levels – Province, District, Sector, Cell, and Village.  Each has an 
elected council, and the most important of these is the District Council which is 
responsible for preparing the District Development Plan.  However, there is reason to 
be concerned for how independent of the ruling party these local councils can be at all 
elected levels.  Village and Cell elections are not secret, and in practice voters simply 
line up behind their preferred candidate.   Sector and District elections are secret, but 
the candidates are elected indirectly by the Cell and Sector councilors respectively.   
If political parties are weak at the national level, they are even weaker at the local 
level and do not oppose the ruling party on any significant issue.  Moreover, if these 
elected officials are consequently in practice supporters of (or at least unwilling to 
oppose) the ruling party, then effectively the ruling party has representatives – 
nominally state employees – who are able to monitor ordinary Rwandans down at the 
lowest level of society.  This remarkable local machinery would account for the 
phenomenal social control in Rwanda.  It existed under previous Rwandan regimes, 
and is mainly attributable to the fact that Rwanda has a small territory and a dense 
population. In addition, how imihigo are used will need to be monitored closely.   
Imihigo are effectively performance contracts to hold District mayors more 
accountable to ordinary Rwandans and are publicly proclaimed and signed with the 
President.  Failure to meet targets set in these imihigo leads to resignation or 
dismissal, but it will be difficult in practice to know whether the ruling party uses 
them as a means to rid itself of District Mayors whose loyalty is questionable.  There 
has already been a high turnover of District Mayors since their introduction in 2006.  
Finally, while the range of decision-making competences of the District has indeed 
increased, the District has not been given a corresponding increase in economic 
autonomy.  It cannot raise significant revenue locally through taxation, and depends 
largely still on money from central government – much of which is earmarked in 
advance.  This financial dependence on the centre was the position in Rwanda’s pre-
genocide administrations as well.   
Fourth, while the Rotberg and Gisselquist’s Index contains a quite 
comprehensive set of political and socio-economic indicators, there are several 
important measures it is missing.  One critical social measure for which we do not 
have reliable national or international indicators is social cohesion.  To what extent 
has there been reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi since the genocide?  To what 
                                                        
60 For a broadly positive assessment of decentralization see the Joint Governance Assesment 
Report for Rwanda where it cites as ‘good examples’ of decentralization the Joint Action and 
Development Forum, umudugudu meetings, ubudehe village level participatory planning programmes, 
abunzi mediation, service satisfaction surveys, citizen report cards, Youth and Women Councils, 
mutuelles de santé Committees, Parents-Teachers Associations, and Water Committees and 
Management Boards in hospitals.  However, as cautioned above, none of these will represent true local 
accountability if they are not truly independent of the ruling party.  This means that the individuals 
concerned are willing and able to oppose the ruling party on issues they feel are important to them.   
De facto power & 
decentralization 
Measuring 
social cohesion 
 29 
 
extent do Rwandans today identify as Rwandan rather than as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa?  
Survey data measuring inter-ethnic trust and ethnic identity at the national level are 
unfortunately unavailable because of the government prohibition on ethnic 
identification.  As a result, they are the subject of some speculation, though the expert 
consensus outside of Rwanda favours the view that there is relatively little 
reconciliation, and more a coexistence based on necessity and imposed from above, 
and that Rwandans continue to identify ethnically but only in private.61  It is an area in 
which we need more research, perhaps using more ethnographic methods, and being 
mindful of the strong possibility of self-censorship by those who live in a regime with 
a poor civil liberties record.    
Finally, on a broader methodological issue related to this last point, it is 
fundamentally problematic to rely on local perceptual or opinion data in a country 
where freedom of speech is heavily constrained and where there is a high degree of 
social control.   Large N surveys of Rwandan respondents to assess issues such as 
trust in state institutions, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and national identity may not 
generate reliable data given the risk of self-censorship.  Considerable caution should 
be applied to such survey proposals.  For example, the monitoring indicators 
established in the 2008 Joint Governance Assessment propose to measure trust and 
reconciliation through periodic perceptions surveys.   Similarly, the Rwandan 
government has written a response to the Rotberg and Gisselquist’s Index findings 
stating that there is a need to use ‘locally generated and locally authentic sources in 
future reports to have scores reflect, as accurately as possible, the reality on the 
ground’.62   It cites its own Governance Advisory Council’s survey of 2400 Rwandans 
on corruption perceptions as an example of such local sources.  Yet Rwandans know 
what the socially and politically acceptable responses are, and it is difficult to estimate 
and control for self-censorship.  Others methods – perhaps more ethnographic in 
nature - should be considered instead.   For example, these may be based on the 
observation of behavior instead of the recording of opinion, and research subjects 
should not be explicitly told what the research is seeking to measure in order to 
minimize the generation of the socially and politically desirable behaviors.   
 
                                                        
61 See footnote 5.   
62 Robert Rotberg and Rachel Gisselquist, The Index of African Governance, Strengthening 
African Governance, World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, USA 2009, pg. 44. 
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Table 1: Rwanda’s Performance Across Time drawn from Rotberg & Gisselquist’s Index of African 
Governance, 2009 
Indicator Source 
2000 
 (scaled out 
of 100) 
2007 
 (scaled out 
of 100) 
Increase/Decrease 
Government Involvement in Armed 
Conflicts 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 
4-2009) 50.0 100.0 50.0 
Number of Battle-Deaths 
UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset (v.4.1), UCDP 
Non-State Conflict Dataset (v.2), and UCDP 
Database 
99.2 100.0 0.8 
Number of Civilian Deaths Due to 
One-Sided Violence 
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset (v.1.3) and 
UCDP Database 100.0 93.7 -6.3 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
Originating From the Country  UNHCR (and WDI 2009 population data) 82.9 91.1 8.2 
Internally-Displaced People 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, and 
USCRI's World Refugee Survey (and WDI 
2009 population data) 
90.2 100.0 9.8 
Ease of Access to Small Arms and 
Light Weapons 
Global Peace Index 2008 and 2009, and our 
own estimates 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Violent Crime (Homicides) 
UN Surveys on Crime Trends; national 
statistics and local research; Global Peace 
Index 2008 and 2009; and our own estimates 
100.0 100.0 0.0 
Ratification of Core International 
Human Rights Conventions 
Index own coding based on information from 
OHCHR 66.7 66.7 0.0 
International Sanctions Index own coding based on information from the UN Security Council 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Property Rights Index Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal) 0.0 33.3 33.3 
Judicial Independence using 
Freedom House's "Rule of Law" 
Sub-Score 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 42.9 42.9 0.0 
Efficiency of the Courts, based on 
the Pre-Trial Detainees 
National authorities as reported in our own 
Index research, by the International Centre for 
Prison Studies, and in the UN Surveys on 
Crime Trends 
72.7 76.4 3.7 
Number of Days to Settle a 
Contract Dispute World Bank's Doing Business surveys 87.6 96.0 8.4 
Public Sector Corruption 
Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency 
International, and Internet Center for 
Corruption Research 
50.0 40.0 -10.0 
Free and Fair Executive Elections Index own coding based on multiple sources 0.0 50.0 50.0 
Opposition Participation in 
Executive Elections Index own coding based on multiple sources 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Free and Fair Legislative Elections Index own coding based on multiple sources 0.0 50.0 50.0 
Opposition Participation in 
Legislative Elections Index own coding based on multiple sources 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Respect for Physical Integrity 
Rights 
Physical Integrity Rights Index of the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset  25.0 62.5 37.5 
Respect for Civil Rights 
Empowerment Rights Index, plus Freedom of 
Assembly and Association indicator, of the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset 
50.0 33.3 -16.7 
Press Freedom Index Reporters without Borders (Worldwide Press Freedom Index) 70.7 51.1 -19.6 
Women's Rights 
Calculated from the three Women's Rights 
indicators in the Cingranelli-Richards Human 
Rights Dataset 
57.1 100.0 42.9 
GDP per capita based on PPP 
(constant 2005 international 
dollars) 
WDI 2009 1.7 2.3 0.6 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI 2009 46.1 50.7 4.6 
Inflation IMF World Economic Outlook 2009 100.0 99.9 0.0 
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Deficits/ Surplus as a % of GDP African Development Bank 2008 25.5 24.8 -0.7 
Reliability of Financial Institutions 
(Contract Intensive Money) 
IMF International Financial Statistics and 
Clague et al. 1999 76.1 80.3 4.2 
Business Environment (Number of 
Days to Start a Business) World Bank's Doing Business surveys 95.1 96.0 0.9 
Density of paved road network per 
1,000 people 
local sources and International Road 
Federation 1.0 2.8 1.7 
Electricity Installed Capacity per 
Capita (kilowatts) 
Energy Information Administration, 
International Energy Annual 2006 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Phone Subscribers per 100 
Inhabitants International Telecommunication Union 0.6 5.8 5.2 
Internet Usage per 100 Inhab-itants International Telecommunication Union 0.1 5.5 5.4 
Environmental Performance Index Esty et al. 2008 40.5 40.5 0.0 
Poverty Rate at the National 
Poverty Line 
WDI 2009, AEO 2009, national sources, and 
others 22.6 22.6 0.0 
Poverty Rate at $1.25 per Day 
(PPP) WDI 2009 13.7 13.7 0.0 
Inequality (GINI Index) WDI 2009, AEO 2009, national sources, and others 51.0 51.0 0.0 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)  WDI 2009 3.6 20.0 16.3 
Child Mortality (per 100,000 live 
births) 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation and 
Murray et al. 2007 35.5 38.6 3.0 
Maternal Mortality (per 100,000 
live births) 
Estimates developed by WHO, UNICEF, 
UNFPA, and The World Bank 2005 38.4 38.4 0.0 
Undernourishment (% of 
population) FAO 28.2 50.7 22.5 
Immunization, measles (% of 
children ages 12-23 months) WHO and UNICEF (as reported in WDI 2009) 67.1 100.0 32.9 
Immunization, DPT (% of children 
ages 12-23 months) 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation and 
Lim et al. 2008 84.8 90.2 5.3 
HIV Prevalence UNAIDS and WHO (as reported in WDI 2009) 83.1 90.1 7.0 
Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 
100,000 people) WHO (as reported in WDI 2009) 72.0 67.8 -4.2 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) WHOSIS (as reported in WDI 2009) 1.2 1.2 0.0 
Nursing and Midwifery Personnel 
(per 1,000 people) WHOSIS (as reported in WDI 2009) 3.1 3.1 0.0 
Access to Improved Sanitation 
Facilities (% of overall population)  
WHO/ UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme 
for Water Supply and Sanitation 2008 22.6 20.4 -2.2 
Access to Drinking Water (% of 
overall population)  
WHO/ UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme 
for Water Supply and Sanitation 2008 54.5 54.5 0.0 
Adult Literacy Rate UNESCO Institute of Statistics 64.0 64.0 0.0 
Adult Literacy Rate, Female UNESCO Institute of Statistics 60.8 60.8 0.0 
Primary School Completion Rate 
(% of relevant age group) UNESCO (as reported in WDI 2009) 5.4 23.1 17.7 
Primary Completion Rate, Female 
(% of relevant age group) UNESCO (as reported in WDI 2009) 7.4 25.6 18.2 
Progression to Secondary School 
(%) UNESCO (as reported in WDI 2009)     0.0 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary UNESCO (as reported in WDI 2009) 53.8 36.8 -17.0 
Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary 
and Secondary Education (%) UNESCO (as reported in WDI 2009) 91.1 100.0 8.9 
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Part II 
Issues specific to the Case & Recommendations 
Genocide is an unusual form of violence and an unusual outcome of civil war.  
Only 31 of 136 cases of internal wars waged between 1955 and 2004 have involved 
genocide or politicide.63  Rwanda’s genocide was particularly unusual.  The 
characteristics of its violence were exceptional:  (i) the speed of the violence:  the 
bulk of the killing took place within 102 days in 1994; (ii) the scale of the violence:  
somewhere between half and one million Rwandans were killed, representing about 
three-quarters of the ethnic Tutsi population; (iii) the scale of the mobilization:  by my 
calculation about one in  four adult Hutu men committed an act of violence; and (iv) 
the geographic ambit of the violence:  there were few communities in Rwanda where 
violence did not occur.  
What accounts for these exceptional characteristics of the violence?  
Exceptional demographic, geographic, and historical characteristics of the Rwandan 
state.  Rwanda’s unusually small territory amplified the effects of contagion 
(contributing to the remarkable geographic ambit of the violence) and made it easier 
for the state to project its power from the centre to periphery (contributing to the 
remarkable scale of civilian mobilization).  Rwanda’s exceptionally high population 
density amplified peer pressure for violence as people lived in close proximity to one 
other and knew what neighbours did or did not do (contributing to the scale and speed 
of mobilization).  Moreover, Rwanda’s low ethnic diversity and high cultural 
homogeneity (Rwandans all spoke Kinyarwanda for example) made mobilization of 
the population much easier.  Finally, the historical idiosyncrasies of geographic 
borders which did not alter significantly across the colonial and post-colonial era, and 
a revolution which swept away the sources of traditional power in Rwanda, reinforced 
the power of the modern state vis-à-vis Rwandan society (contributing to the speed of 
the mobilization).   
However, while the expression may be exceptional, the mechanism behind the 
genocidal violence is not unique.  At the heart of the genocide lies essentially a 
threat-opportunity mechanism.  Events which embody this mechanism are not 
unusual.  Civil wars, democratization, and assassinations of Heads of State for 
example are not unusual events in sub-Saharan Africa.  Their simultaneous 
occurrence– as in Rwanda – is highly unusual and moreover, they occurred against an 
unusual baseline:  an extraordinary Rwandan state.   
 
Strategic Recommendations 
In terms of recommendations, I make one overall recommendation for the 
Rwandan government and three broad recommendations for the international 
community. 
                                                        
63 Taken from Barbara Harff, "Annual Data on Cases of Genocide and Politicide, 1955-2006," 
(Political Instability Task Force, Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, 2006).   
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To the Rwandan government, it is important to realize that stability based on 
economic growth and strong leadership is not sustainable in the long-run as 
economies will fluctuate and leaders must change.  It is in its strategic long-term self-
interest therefore to reverse the current trend and increase political space in order to 
permit civil and political society to evolve into responsible and independent 
counterweights to its own power.   The ruling party cannot stay in office indefinitely 
and strengthening the independence of both state institutions and civil and political 
society improves the chances of a constitutional and peaceful change of regime one 
day.   
 At the moment the Rwandan government sees ‘consensus democracy’ as the 
target optimal political system for Rwanda rather than competitive, multiparty 
democracy.   It is of course not difficult to attain consensus if there is no-one willing 
or able to oppose you.  The government’s rationale for constraining civil and political 
society and for limiting political liberalization is based on twin fears:  (i) fear that a 
democratically-elected Hutu-majoritarian government will expose the Tutsi minority 
to renewed persecution; and (ii) fear that ethnic extremism may rise again from within 
Rwandan society if competitive politics are re-introduced.  These are legitimate 
concerns, but they are not insuperable.  Minority protection is not irreconcilable with 
democratic, majoritarian rule and ethnic extremism may be contained if a mature and 
responsible political culture evolves within both the ruling elite and civil and political 
society.   
Such a change in political culture – which would mark a departure from the 
practice in all of Rwanda’s previous regimes – could be encouraged through a series 
of graduated, increasingly significant steps carefully sequenced across time.  With 
each new step there should be a consideration of whether there has been a positive 
shift towards a more responsible and mature political culture.  It is the government as 
the more powerful actor which must initiate and lead the change but progress 
assessments should be made with the assistance of external actors to minimize the 
conflict of interest and civil and political society should be involved in drawing up a 
schedule of such steps.  As a tentative schedule, I suggest several possible steps here.   
To his credit, President Kagame has already taken an important first step through his 
zero-tolerance campaign against corruption and through the introduction of imihigo 
performance targets to instill accountability at the local level.  A next important step 
might be to reform Rwanda’s genocide ideology, sectarianism, and media laws which 
have engendered so much resentment among opposition politicians and journalists.  
Following on from this, the government should consider removing the prohibition on 
ethnic identification in the public sphere.   If ethnic identification were permitted, it 
would allow for monitorable and peaceful expression of grievances - real or perceived 
– and will go some way to addressing perceptions of ethnic bias in the distribution of 
important opportunities such as state and para-statal positions and educational places 
which has been a persistent grievance in Rwanda’s history.  Eventually there would 
need to be a move to allow political parties to register and campaign freely.  This is an 
important threshold step and would need to be carefully assessed.  Ultimately larger 
and possibly more painful steps may need to be taken.  For example all RPF members 
who may have committed war crimes should face a fair trial – either internationally or 
at home – to end the perception of victor’s justice following the genocide.  All of 
these steps will send a very powerful signal to Rwanda’s civil and political society.  
To be clear though, Rwanda’ opposition politicians and journalists will also be held 
Recommendation 
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accountable for irresponsible rhetoric and actions.  The gradual opening up of 
political space depends on their maturity and tolerance.   
To the international community in general, Rwanda’s genocide represents a 
potentially cautionary tale in international conflict resolution.  Rapid democratization 
may not always be the best strategy for ending civil wars.  A careful assessment of the 
relative balance of power between incumbent and challenger political elites should 
influence the speed with which a country undergoes political liberalization.    
To the international donor community in particular, it is important for it 
realize: (i) that Rwanda’s development success is largely dependent on the current 
ruling party, and donor strategy must also consider the time beyond RPF rule; (ii) that 
it enjoys the only effective influence on the Rwandan government; and (iii) that it is 
more effective when it acts in unison than individually.   
The central thesis of this report has been that Rwanda’s development success 
is fragile because it depends on the continued rule of the winning party to Rwanda’s 
civil war, the RPF, and its Chairman, President Paul Kagame.   Donors must 
recognize that their assistance – of which a considerable portion is in the form of 
general budgetary support – should be directed not at supporting the rule of the RPF, 
but rather to supporting the state and the independence of its institutions.  In practice, 
this distinction is very difficult to observe and to enforce, and it requires astute 
political assessment – an activity which is outside of some donors’ economic-centric 
mandates and which some donors feel they lack the capacity to undertake.  Yet 
strengthening state institutions – and separating them from the ruling party - means 
that Rwanda’s development achievements stand a better chance of enduring life after 
the RPF.  Not to make this distinction between state and party is to repeat the same 
mistake donors made when they supported Rwanda before the genocide.  Aid then 
supported a ruling party, the MRND, which was practically synonymous with the 
state, which had been in power for 21 years, and which contained hardliners unwilling 
to see regime change.  The MRND’s unwillingness to share power forced the current 
ruling party to organize an armed rebellion to topple it.  Donors would be 
sleepwalking into potential disaster again if they allowed aid once more to entrench 
Rwanda’s current ruling party, instead of helping this party to transition power 
peacefully in the foreseeable future.   Having won the 2010 elections, the next seven 
years represent the final opportunity for President Kagame and the RPF to firmly 
establish the rule of law before its ultimate test in August 2017 when he reaches the 
end of his constitutionally-restricted two term limit.   
Rwanda – as before the genocide – remains a highly aid-dependent state and it 
is a dependency that its President has explicitly stated he wishes to end.  The 
country’s principal donors are the World Bank, the European Union, USAID, and 
DFID, and together they enjoy potentially considerable leverage over the Rwandan 
government.  The Rwandan Judiciary and Legislature in their present incarnations are 
not yet effective counterweights to the Executive, and civil and political society is 
even weaker than either of these institutions.  At present, the limited accountability 
that exists comes in the form of a small number of individuals (usually academics and 
journalists) and NGOs from international civil society and who have limited 
influence.  The international donor community then is uniquely positioned to 
convince the Rwandan government of the strategic utility behind a path towards first 
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the rule of law and then towards political liberalization, and to create the incentives 
and disincentives to keep the government on it.  International donors are rightly 
concerned with the legitimacy of such an interventionist strategy given international 
failings in 1994.  One solution may to be involve the African Union – or some 
regional entity which enjoys more legitimacy and credibility - in assessments of 
Rwanda’s overall direction.  Its assessments could be used as one criterion for raising 
or lowering levels of development support. 
Lastly, donor coordination on using development assistance conditionally is 
also important.  It is worth pointing out that the Rwandan government is cultivating a 
relationship with China.  The Beijing consensus is less likely to examine the quality 
of its partner’s or recipient’s governance in distributing assistance or resources.  As 
has been pointed out already, the donor community need not have an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach to aid for Rwanda.64  It would be just as effective to levy a small amount of 
money from the Budgetary Support package for each step away from the rule of law 
the government takes.  Such a move would require some innovation and courage on 
the part of donors, and some recognition on the part of the Rwandan government that 
it is in the country’s long-term interest to separate the party from the state.  A good 
starting point would be to draw on the monitoring indicators established in the Joint 
Governance Assessment to assess progress.  However, different measures will have to 
be used for the more sensitive issues such as trust, reconciliation, and perceptions of 
government institutions and public services given the likelihood of self-censorship.   
 
Part III:  Assessing the Risk of Future Violence:  The World Bank’s 
‘Stresses and Capabilities’ Framework 
 
Drawing on what I have already written, I summarize here the factors I believe 
increase the risk of violence recurring – the stresses on Rwanda – and the factors 
which exist to contain these stresses – Rwanda’s capabilities.  This stress-capability 
framework emerged from the extensive research undertaken in preparation of the 
World Development Report 2011.  The stresses on Rwanda are of two kinds:  those 
which directly increase tensions along ethnic boundaries; and those which increase 
political instability generally, thereby creating the opportunity indirectly for ethnic 
tensions to surface.  
Perhaps the most significant source of direct stress is the longstanding 
grievance over the ethnic distribution of state power and resources.  The monopoly of 
power by either one ethnic elite or the other has motivated forcible regime change 
three times in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda: 1959-62, 1973, and 1990-4.65  In 
post-genocide Rwanda, despite a constitution explicitly premised on ethnic equality, 
                                                        
64 See Peter Uvin’s note entitled ‘Wake Up:  Some Personal Reflections and 
Recommendations’, June 2003.  Accessed online October 23rd 2009.   
65 In 1973, the grievance was intra-Hutu, between an incumbent Hutu elite from the south-
central Rwanda and disenchanted Hutu elite from the north.  It led to a military coup which  was 
accompanied by ethnic violence directed against the Tutsi minority.   
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the identification of the victorious rebel group and now ruling party with a specific 
Tutsi elite has done nothing to rebut perceptions of ethnic bias in the de facto exercise 
of state power and in the allocation of state and para-statal jobs and educational 
opportunities.  The government’s prohibition on explicit ethnic identification means 
that even public debate - in which such perceptions could be aired and peacefully 
dealt with - is not permitted.   
A second source of direct stress are the constraints on civil and political 
society to voice dissent.  For zealous members of the ruling party, criticism of the 
government is difficult to distinguish from perceived anti-ethnic (usually anti-Tutsi) 
sentiment.  This has led to self-censorship, and beneath the surface, it is quite likely 
that tensions arising from the inability to express dissatisfaction freely are 
accumulating.    Thirdly, there are elements of Rwandan society who have remained 
outside of Rwanda since the genocide of 1994 – both in eastern Congo and overseas – 
and who have not participated in the government’s experiment to minimize ethnicity 
and to build a single, national identity.  Notable among them are the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in eastern Congo and the Rally for the 
Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) in Europe and Canada.  Both 
remain opposed to the ruling party which they see as illegitimate, and the FDLR is 
prepared to use force to overthrow it.  Lastly, as with any political party, there are 
tensions within the ruling party itself reflecting both personal and policy 
disagreements with the party’s leadership.  Several RPF members have left to form an 
independent party, the Green party in August 2009.  However, the specific risk for 
Rwanda is that if RPF unity fails, or if there is a crisis of confidence in Paul Kagame’s 
leadership, before credible alternatives have emerged, then the resulting power 
vacuum may once again be exploited by political extremists. 
In terms of indirect stresses, land conflicts tied to demographic pressure, and 
then land, income, educational, and job inequalities remain potentially charged 
political issues and are longstanding sources of grievance.  The government 
introduced a new land law in 2005 to formalize property rights in Rwanda, but the 
requirement of formal registration may disadvantage poor, uneducated smallholders 
and also lead to land-grabbing.66   Continued demographic pressure - population 
density was at a historical and continental high of 834 persons per square mile in 2002 
– has made land an even scarcer commodity and amplified localized conflicts over 
land ownership and boundaries.  A further amplifier of land-related stress is the 
tension between recent returnees – descendants of Tutsi exiles from 1959 and Hutu 
who fled after the genocide in 1994 – and those who occupied and cultivated the land 
in their absence.   Vertical and spatial inequality in land, income, education, and jobs 
is not yet an issue high on the national political agenda.  However, the growing 
disparity between urban and rural communities, and between different sub-regions of 
Rwanda, as well as the concentration of assets and opportunities within the hands of a 
relatively small group, is a source of tension at the local level which will continue to 
grow.   All of these indirect stresses have the potential to destabilize society and local 
                                                        
66 See An Ansoms, Striving for Growth and Bypassing the Poor?  A Critical Review of 
Rwanda’s Rural Sector Policies, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of 
Antwerp, Belgium 2007.   
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authority at the grassroots level, and to become national-level issues if political parties 
choose to mobilize around them.   
Rwanda’s two strongest capabilities to contain these stresses remain (i) its 
leadership under President Paul Kagame; and (ii) the extraordinary power of the 
modern state over society in Rwanda.  Although his position is in large part 
attributable to his victory in the war, Paul Kagame has since established himself as 
Rwanda’s pater familias or ‘Big Man’.  He follows in the footsteps of other Big Men 
in Rwanda’s history:  Grégoire Kayibanda, President of the First Republic for 11 
years, and Juvénal Habyarimana, President of the Second Republic for 21 years – 
though, in contrast with Paul Kagame, both these ‘Big Men’ were Hutu and did not 
seek to promote a single national identity and eliminate racial/ethnic identities.  In all 
likelihood, Paul Kagame is both respected and feared within Rwanda on both sides of 
the ethnic divide – and including by those within his own ruling party.  He has 
demonstrated his willingness to oust from office even those close to him if he has 
determined they have committed wrongdoing.  This uncertainty over the security of 
anyone’s position in Rwanda has in part inspired a cadre of individuals who are 
highly motivated to demonstrate their loyalty to him.  This desire to show loyalty has 
in turn in part inspired them to pursue his opponents with formidable zeal, tolerating 
little criticism of either him or his party.  While this works as long as Paul Kagame is 
President, it raises questions over what will happen when he leaves.   
The second important source of capability to contain social stress is the 
remarkable Rwandan state. 67   It has historically been very strong relative to Rwandan 
society – across the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras.  Those who control 
the Rwandan state possess the means to control society to an extent which few other 
African nation-states enjoy.   This power has been used for both positive and negative 
ends:  1994 saw its formidable civilian and military apparatus used to mobilize the 
population to eliminate one element of Rwandan society.  The post-genocide era has 
seen the state’s apparatus deployed to maintain internal order, and conduct radical 
social interventions such as gacaca and ingando.  The source of the state’s unusual 
strength can be traced to a set of idiosyncratic geographic, demographic, and historic 
factors.  First, Rwanda’s small size has made it easier to project the power of the state 
from the centre to the periphery.  The advantage of being small is reflected in 
Rwanda’s impressive local state machinery able to implement policies from above 
and monitor societal response below, and also its extensive road network facilitating 
the movement of people across the country.  Second, Rwanda’s dense population has 
not only amplified land conflicts, but it has made it difficult for individuals to escape 
the scrutiny of the state from above:  it has state representatives at the lowest echelons 
of society.  What you do and what you do not do is easy to monitor in Rwanda. 
Moreover, Rwandans enjoy a linguistic and cultural homogeneity that few other 
African nations enjoy.  It is not composed of many distinct ethnic groups who have no 
tradition of being governed together.  Lastly, there has been a high level of continuity 
in Rwanda’s territorial borders across the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
                                                        
67 For more detail on the unusual power of the Rwandan state, see Straus, Scott, The 
Order of Genocide:  Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, Cornell University Press 2006 and McDoom, 
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Genocide, Doctoral thesis, London School of Economics, 2009.   
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eras.  It has been the same central authority governing the same people across time.   
In short, as long as there is an elite in control of this powerful state machinery who 
wish internal peace and who face no credible opposition, it is likely there will not be 
renewed ethnic conflict.  The question arises, however, over what will happen in the 
absence of this leadership.  
The dependence of Rwanda’s stability on strong leadership and economic 
growth highlights the fragility of Rwanda’s exit from violence.  Leaders must change 
and economies will fluctuate.  The long-term durability of peace depends also on the 
gradual opening of political space and de-concentration of power in the hands of the 
ruling elite to allow Rwanda’s state institutions and civil and political society to 
evolve into responsible and independent counterweights to the regime.  In the absence 
of such a shift in political culture Rwanda’s prospects for a peaceful and 
constitutional change of regime one day may be diminished and the remarkable 
achievements of the current regime after the genocide undone.   
  
 
